Customers dealing with troubled automotive suppliers often decide to resource production to other suppliers rather than facilitate a true restructuring of the troubled supplier's business. Such resourcing, however, generally cannot be done overnight. Tier 1 suppliers or original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") often take months to resource production. Because of the "just in time" production process, Tier 1 suppliers and OEMs often cannot afford to be without component parts or tooling for the period of time that it may take to resource.
In response to the increasing complexity of cross-border restructurings and liquidations, a new chapter (Chapter 15) was added to the US Bankruptcy Code in 2005. Chapter 15 is meant to provide a framework for effectively and efficiently dealing with cross-border insolvency proceedings involving the United States by providing the representative of a foreign insolvency case with certain benefits and protections.
Directors and officers of troubled companies are already keenly cognizant of their potential liability for any breaches of fiduciary duty, negligence and fraud.
A federal bankruptcy judge has ordered Wells Fargo to pay $250,000 in sanctions for its role as a trustee for a pooled subprime mortgage trust. In re: Nosek, Case No. 02-46025-JBR (Bankr. D. Mass.).
I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcies and restructurings involving partners and partnerships1 raise a number of unique tax issues. While the IRS has provided guidance with respect to a number of these issues, a surprising number of unresolved issues remain. The first part of this outline summarizes the state of the law with respect to general tax issues that typically arise in connection with partner and partnership bankruptcies and restructurings. The balance of the outline discusses tax issues that arise under Subchapter K when troubled partnerships are reorganized.
With the possibility of a major stock brokerage liquidation appearing more likely than it has been in recent periods, the effect of a liquidation on customers and financial counterparties has become of great interest to many of our clients and others.
When an insurer becomes insolvent and is placed in rehabilitation or liquidation, state insurance laws are very clear that reinsurance proceeds owed by the insolvent insurer’s various reinsurers may not be denied or reduced as a result of the insolvency. The insurer’s policyholders, however, may only look to the estate of the insurer for payment of claims. But, what happens in a situation where the insolvent insurer never took on any risk but merely acted as a fronting carrier for the reinsurer?
If you thought, like many, that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billet, 2007 Del. LEXIS 357 (Del. 2007), put the theory of “deepening insolvency” to rest, once and for all, well, think again. A recent decision, George L. Miller v. McCown De Leeuw & Co. (In re The Brown Schools), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1226 (Bankr. D. Del. April 24, 2008), from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware shows that “deepening insolvency” endures, albeit in reduced form.
In March 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided In re Airadigm Communications, Inc. (Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. FCC),1 a case that built upon the Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc (“NextWave”).2 In NextWave, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s participation in a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Introduction
In Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In re Oneida Ltd.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed whether a premium payment created by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”)2 for pension plans terminated as part of a chapter 11 restructuring is a pre-petition claim or a post-petition administrative expense. The Court held that the statutorily mandated premium payment was a contingent pre-petition claim and was discharged upon confirmation of the debtor’s plan.