Over the past year, digital asset investors have become acutely aware of asset custody and counterparty credit risks due to the high-profile bankruptcies of Voyager, Celsius, BlockFi, and FTX. These investors have found that, at times, their assets may be stuck in a bankruptcy proceeding for years. However, these investors—now bankruptcy claim holders—have options for more immediate liquidity.
DURING THE PAST YEAR, many investors in the distressed debt market have received postreorganization private equity1 either through a confirmed plan of reorganization or through participation in a rights offering. Unlike publicly traded equity, each new issuance of postreorganization equity leaves recipients, issuers, and agents potentially facing uncharted territory in terms of how the instrument is to trade and settle.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington recently construed the terms of a customary loan agreement to preclude certain hedge funds viewed as “acquir[ing] distressed debt and engag[ing] in predatory lending” from voting on a debtor’s plan of reorganization. Meridian Sunrise Village, LLC v. NB Distressed Debt Investment Fund Ltd. (In re Meridian Sunrise Village, LLC), 2014 WL 909219 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 2014).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on March 1, 2013, that a bankruptcy court had not erred in applying a prime plus 1.75 percent interest rate to a secured lender’s $39 million claim under a "cramdown" plan of reorganization. Wells Fargo Bank N.A v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC (In the Matter of Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 776317 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2013).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the "District Court") on March 29, 2012 held that a bankruptcy court sale order issued under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code ("Section 363") could not extinguish state law successor liability personal injury claims brought against the purchaser by third parties injured after the close of the bankruptcy case, but whose injuries arose out of conduct of the debtor prior to its bankruptcy. Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Industries, Inc.), 2012 WL 1038672 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
CURRENTLY, NEGOTIATION and documentation of claims trades remain largely unregulated, with only limited oversight from bankruptcy courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Generally, the bankruptcy court’s, or the claims agent’s, involvement in claims trading is ministerial, i.e., maintaining the claims register and recording transfers if the form complies with the rule. Only if there is an objection to a claims transfer does the bankruptcy court become involved in the substance of a transfer.
Over the past year, digital asset investors have become acutely aware of asset custody and counterparty credit risks due to the high-profile bankruptcies of Voyager, Celsius, BlockFi, and FTX. These investors have found that, at times, their assets may be stuck in a bankruptcy proceeding for years. However, these investors—now bankruptcy claim holders—have options for more immediate liquidity.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on March 1, 2013, that a bankruptcy court had not erred in applying a prime plus 1.75 percent interest rate to a secured lender’s $39 million claim under a "cramdown" plan of reorganization. Wells Fargo Bank N.A v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC (In the Matter of Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 776317 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2013).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the "District Court") on March 29, 2012 held that a bankruptcy court sale order issued under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code ("Section 363") could not extinguish state law successor liability personal injury claims brought against the purchaser by third parties injured after the close of the bankruptcy case, but whose injuries arose out of conduct of the debtor prior to its bankruptcy. Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Industries, Inc.), 2012 WL 1038672 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
DURING THE PAST YEAR, many investors in the distressed debt market have received postreorganization private equity1 either through a confirmed plan of reorganization or through participation in a rights offering. Unlike publicly traded equity, each new issuance of postreorganization equity leaves recipients, issuers, and agents potentially facing uncharted territory in terms of how the instrument is to trade and settle.