The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on April 23, 2019, denied the litigation trustee’s motion for leave to file a sixth amended complaint that would have asserted constructive fraudulent transfer claims against 5,000 Tribune Company (“Tribune”) shareholders. In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, 2019 WL 1771786 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2019). The safe harbor of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 546(e) barred the trustee’s proposed claims, held the court. Id., at * 12.
A New York bankruptcy court, on Dec. 12, 2013, issued a 166-page decision after a 34-day trial, concluding that the spin-off of a highly profitable energy business constituted a fraudulent transfer intended to shield the business from massive environmental liabilities, and awarding damages of up to approximately $14.5 billion.[1]Tronox Inc. et al. v. Kerr McGee et al. (In re Tronox et al.) (Bankruptcy S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013) (J.
“A … transferee [who] received fraudulent transfers with actual knowledge or inquiry notice of fraud or insolvency” loses any “good faith” defense available under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Jan. 9, 2019. Janvey v. GMAG LLC, 2019 WL 141107, *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019) (emphasis added).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 22, 2012, held that $1.6 million in political contributions made to five different political committees by Ponzi scheme defendants between 2000 and 2008 were fraudulent transfers made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors” under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc., et al., 2012 WL 5207460 ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. 2012).
“… Ponzi scheme payments to satisfy legitimate antecedent debts to defendant banks could not be avoided” by a bankruptcy trustee “absent transaction-specific proof of actual intent to defraud or the statutory elements of constructive fraud – transfer by an insolvent debtor who did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on Nov. 20, 2018. Stoebner v. Opportunity Finance LLC, 2018 WL 6055636 at *4 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2018), citing Finn v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W. 2d 638, 653-56 (Minn. 2015).
In a decision likely to affect thousands of Madoff investors, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on Aug. 16, 2011 unanimously upheld the method used by the liquidating trustee for Bernard L.
Not uncommonly, a preference complaint fails to adequately allege that the transfers sought to be recovered by the trustee were made “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made”, as required under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, when faced with a complaint to recover alleged preferential transfers, a defendant can proceed in one of two ways: (i) file an answer and raise affirmative defenses, or (ii) move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
In Husky Int’l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145 (U.S. May 16, 2016), a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court held that a fraudulent conveyance scheme comported with the requirements of “actual fraud” to create a potential new debt dischargeability exception pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Criminal defendants facing onerous restitution obligations as part of their sentence might contemplate a bankruptcy filing, in the hope of staving off the restitution obligation. In a case of first impression, the Second Circuit recently considered whether the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision halts a defendant’s obligation to pay restitution and firmly closed the door on that potential gambit.