The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 10, 2010, that a corporate debtor’s pre-bankruptcy severance payments to its former chief executive officer (“CEO”) were fraudulent transfers. In re Transtexas Gas Corp., ____ F.3d _____, 2010 BL 28145 (5th Cir. 2/10/10). Because of its holding “that the payments were fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code,” the court did “not consider other possible violations, including [the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] or [Bankruptcy Code] Section 547(b) [preferences].” Id. at *5.
“[T]he largely debt-financed purchase of a family-owned [business] was not a fraudulent [transfer] and did not amount to a violation of the fiduciary duty of the company’s directors,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on Dec. 4, 2017. In re Irving Tanning Co., 2017 W.L. 5988834, *1 (1st Cir. Dec. 4, 2017).
A Florida bankruptcy court, on Oct. 13, 2009, issued a 182-page decision after a 13-day trial, among other things, avoiding on fraudulent transfer grounds (a) secured subsidiary guarantees of $500 million and (b) $420 million pre-bankruptcy payments. In re Tousa, Inc., et al., Case No. 08-10928; Adv. P. 08-1435 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2009). The decision is on appeal to the district court.
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A defendant bank (“Bank”) in a fraudulent transfer suit “could not prove” its “good faith” defense for loan repayments it received after its “investigator discovered [the] fraudulent past” of the Ponzi scheme debtor’s principal but “failed to disclose that past to [the Bank’s account] manager,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2017. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *28 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017).
“Reasonably equivalent value” as a defense to a fraudulent transfer suit “can be satisfied with evidence that the transferee (1) fully performed under a lawful, arm’s-length contract for fair market value, (2) provided consideration that had objective value at the time of the transaction, and (3) made the exchange in the ordinary course of the transferee’s business,” held the Supreme Court of Texas on April 1, 2016, in response to a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Janvey v. Golf Channel, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2016 WL 1268188, at *2 (Tex.
Not uncommonly, a preference complaint fails to adequately allege that the transfers sought to be recovered by the trustee were made “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made”, as required under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, when faced with a complaint to recover alleged preferential transfers, a defendant can proceed in one of two ways: (i) file an answer and raise affirmative defenses, or (ii) move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
In Husky Int’l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145 (U.S. May 16, 2016), a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court held that a fraudulent conveyance scheme comported with the requirements of “actual fraud” to create a potential new debt dischargeability exception pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Criminal defendants facing onerous restitution obligations as part of their sentence might contemplate a bankruptcy filing, in the hope of staving off the restitution obligation. In a case of first impression, the Second Circuit recently considered whether the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision halts a defendant’s obligation to pay restitution and firmly closed the door on that potential gambit.
A continuing theme of this blog series on Madoff has been the perplexing and inconsistent manner, virtually to the point of arbitrariness and unfairness, with which Trustee Irving Picard has handled charities that invested with Madoff. Installment