The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a stern warning to professional services providers regarding “tail fees,” establishing a presumption of unreasonableness against contract terms requiring fees not attached to tangible, identifiable and material benefits to the debtor’s estate.

The Bottom Line:

A recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York concluded that a landlord
who obtains a judgment of possession and warrant of
eviction prepetition, yet is stayed from executing on the
warrant due to the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, may not be
entitled to post-petition rent as an administrative expense.
In In re Association of Graphic Communications, Inc., No. 07-
10278 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010), the court decided
that, under New York law, the prepetition warrant of

Funds' assets in the U.S. has been denied by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. See 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2949, *26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30 , 2007). The Funds were being liquidated in the Cayman Islands, but the bankruptcy court held that they were not eligible for Chapter 15 relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") because the liquidations were not pending in a country where the Funds had their "center of main interests" or an "establishment" for the conduct of business.

The October 15, 2009 decision of the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Pillowtex opens the door for creditors in the Third Circuit to increase their "new value" preference defense under the "subsequent advance" approach.In re Pillowtex, No. 03-12339 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 15, 2009).

A trustee’s power to avoid preference payments is circumscribed by the statutory defenses set forth in section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The "subsequent new value" defense set forth in section 547(c)(4) has three well-established elements:

The U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2010 Term (which extends from October 2010 to October 2011, although the Court hears argument only until June or July) officially got underway on October 4, three days after Elena Kagan was formally sworn in as the Court’s 112th Justice and one of three female Justices sitting on the Court.

In the July/August 2010 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on an important ruling handed down by bankruptcy judge James M. Peck in the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases addressing the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code’s general setoff rules (set forth in section 553) and the Code’s safe harbors for financial contracts (found principally in sections 555, 556, and 559 through 562). In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 433 B.R. 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

In a client advisory sent by our office a few months ago, we described a decision in the Madoff saga in which the District Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court) closed off a potential avenue of significant recovery for the Madoff Trustee (the Trustee) and the Ponzi scheme victims by denying the Trustee standing to pursue certain claims against feeder funds – firms that sent investors’ funds to Madof

In an adversary proceeding brought by a liquidating company to determine the availability of coverage under the debtor's insurance policies, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware has held that the insolvency of an underlying insurer did not affect an excess carrier's obligation for claims within its own layer of coverage. In re Integrated Health Services, Inc., 2007 WL 2687593 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2007). Although the adversary proceeding was initially filed in bankruptcy court, it was consensually withdrawn to the district court.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, applying federal law, has held that certain lawsuits brought by a bankruptcy trustee were related claims, even though they alleged unique causes of action, because they were based upon the same course of conduct.  The court also found that the trustee was pursuing claims both on behalf of the policyholder-debtor and its subsidiaries, and therefore the application of the insured versus insured exclusion was “unclear.”  Nonetheless, the court found that the individual insureds were entitled to 100% of their defense cos