In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “U.S. Court”) exercised its abstention powers and dismissed an involuntary chapter 11 petition filed against an Argentine company, Compania de Alimentos Fargo, SA (“Fargo”).1 Fargo, a debtor in an insolvency proceeding in Argentina, had moved to dismiss the involuntary petition principally because its Argentine bankruptcy case was still pending.
While section 503(b)(9) claims deserve priority payment over general unsecured claims, they do not provide a basis for stripping a debtor’s defenses in determining the allowed amount of a section 503(b)(9) claim.
Note: Pepper Hamilton LLP serves as co-counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the Committee) in the ADI case. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and not of the Committee.
Back in the mists of time, a seller that had a valid reclamation claim but was denied the return of its goods was entitled to an administrative expense claim (a claim with a higher priority than a general unsecured claim and thus a better chance of getting paid) or a lien on the debtor’s assets. The 2005 amendment to § 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code changed all that by stripping away those alternative remedies.
The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the relative priority of claims against a debtor and the waterfall in which such claims are typically paid. In order for a court to confirm a plan over a dissenting class of creditors – what is commonly called a “cram-down” – the Bankruptcy Code demands thateither (i) the dissenting class receives the full value of its claim, or (ii) no classes junior to that class receive any property under the plan on account of their junior claims or interests. This is known as the “absolute priority rule.”
When a company goes into administration, time does not stop running against its creditors' claims for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980. This is different to where a company goes into liquidation as time does then stop running. The effect there is that the claim stays live whereas in an administration, once the limitation period has expired, the claim is time-barred.
Why has the Financial Support Direction (FSD) been issued?
In Pick v Sumpter and another, the first defendant's trustee in bankruptcy applied for an order for possession of the defendants' matrimonial home. At the hearing in May 2006, the evidence showed that the sum outstanding as at November 2005 was £25,571 but did not take into account legal costs. That sum was an estimate and did not take into account statutory interest on the bankrupt's debts beyond the date of the hearing, solicitor's costs of the possession hearing or any increase or decrease in the trustee's remuneration.