As the Madoff Securities and Stanford Financial schemes have unraveled in recent months, financial industry participants have had to scrutinize closely their involvement with these entities. A key issue in each of these cases will be the extent to which the trustee (or similar representative) can “claw back” payments made as part of the Ponzi and related fraudulent schemes. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently considered similar facts in Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P.

In recent opinions, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have revisited the doctrine of equitable subordination and have underscored the requirement that, before a court can equitably subordinate a creditor’s claim, the court must find that other creditors have been harmed by the actions of the creditor. Importantly, both decisions stress that equitable subordination is meant to be remedial and not punitive, and may not be imposed merely because a creditor has engaged in misconduct.

The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the relative priority of claims against a debtor and the waterfall in which such claims are typically paid. In order for a court to confirm a plan over a dissenting class of creditors – what is commonly called a “cram-down” – the Bankruptcy Code demands thateither (i) the dissenting class receives the full value of its claim, or (ii) no classes junior to that class receive any property under the plan on account of their junior claims or interests. This is known as the “absolute priority rule.”

The existence of trusts that may be connected to a borrower’s assets can be a lending hazard. They do not appear on PPSA search print-outs and, in many cases, they are not shown on a borrower’s financial statements and cannot be searched through traditional due diligence methods.

In an earlier edition of Fully Secured (June 27, 2012 – Volume 3, Number 2), we reported on the Ontario Court of Justice decision in Snoek ⁷ where security granted by a borrower (“HSLP”) to a group of individual creditors (“B”) was held to constitute an improper preference and declared invalid following a challenge by the trustee in bankruptcy. B had been one victim of a Ponzi scheme involving numerous unsecured creditors of HSLP.

Shareholders often overlook the need to properly document loan advances in their haste to provide funds to the company, without being aware of the significant consequences that can result.

The case of Bulbinder Singh Sandhu (trading as Isher Fashions UK) v Jet Star Retail Limited (trading as Mark One) (in administration) highlights that care needs to be taken to ensure that Retention of Title (RoT) clauses are effective. More information on ROT clauses is available in our 'Litigation survival guide - part 3. Retention of title: sellers beware!'

The facts

Facts

In Andrew Fender (Administrator of FG Collier & Sons Limited) - v - National Westminster Bank Plc, a company went into administration. The administrator applied to the court to establish whether he had to treat NatWest bank as a secured or unsecured creditor of the company.

When there is a dispute as to which administrator should be appointed, the wishes of the creditor, for whose benefit the administration was, takes precedence.

Bankruptcy remote structures have become common in recent years to attempt to prevent a borrower from filing for Chapter 11. One such structure is commonly referred to as a “golden share.” The “golden share” typically refers to a noneconomic membership interest provided to a lender whose vote would be necessary for the borrower to file Chapter 11.

The Fifth Circuit in InreFranchiseServs.ofN.Am.,Inc., 891 F.3d 198, 209