The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1
What is a Structured Dismissal?
On February 22nd, the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the liquidation of Lehman Brothers' broker-dealer business denied motions seeking to modify the order approving the sale of the business to Barclays Capital. The Court noted the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the sale, the affirmance of that sale order, and movants' failure to challenge the order for one year. The court held that even if the evidence presented here were known in 2008, the result would have been the same, i.e., the sale would have been approved.
Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has reversed a bankruptcy court order that had required a group of lenders (“Transeastern Lenders”) to disgorge, as a fraudulent transfer, approximately $421 million paid to them by a joint venture partner (“TOUSA”) in satisfaction of their legitimate, uncontested loans to the joint venture that TOUSA had guaranteed. Together with pre-judgment interest, the total amount to be paid by the Transeastern Lenders was in excess of $480 million.
Crumbs Bake Shop Inc. shut down in July and filed for bankruptcy in New Jersey court that same month. The bankruptcy court ordered an auction sale, and a purchaser has come forward to buy all of the company’s assets.
Recently, a Colorado bankruptcy court considered for the first time the effects of Bankruptcy Code Section 552 on a lender’s security interest in the proceeds of an FCC broadcast license. The court held that a prepetition security interest would not extend to proceeds received from a post-petition transfer of the debtor’s FCC license because the debtor did not have an attachable, prepetition property interest in the proceeds. Such an interest does not arise until the FCC approves an agreement to sell the license.
The case of Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), No. 12- 1200, was easily one of the most closely watched bankruptcy cases in many years. Last week’s decision in that case, however, was far less dramatic than some practitioners feared it might be. The Supreme Court answered two important questions regarding the power of bankruptcy courts that it left open three years ago in Stern v. Marshall.
On September 14th, a Bankruptcy Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of defendants, brokerages through whom the debtor conducted a fraudulent stock lending scheme. The Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee cannot avoid as fraudulent transfers funds and stock received by defendants directly from the victims of the scheme, margin interest paid to defendants by the debtor, and cash transfers that the debtor directly deposited into the brokerage accounts in the year prior to the bankruptcy filing.
Defanging Stern v. Marshall1: The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York Modifies the Reference of Bankruptcy Matters to Address Issues Resulting from the Supreme Court’s Ruling
On June 14th, the First Circuit modified the bankruptcy court's $250,000 sanction award against a mortgage servicer who erroneously claimed to be the mortgage holder. The mortgage servicer did not deliberately or intentionally seek to mislead the bankruptcy court and its actions were not prejudicial. First Circuit therefore modified the award to $5,000. In re Jacalyn S. Nosek.