The recent bankruptcy case of Hostess has centered on Hostess’s attempts to reject collective bargaining agreements with its unions. Hostess has emphasized that realigning labor costs is essential to its ability to successfully reorganize. Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth detailed requirements that a debtor must meet to modify or reject CBAs. Bankruptcy courts’ ultimate decision to authorize rejection of a CBA frequently turns on a detailed examination of the evidence presented in support of the rejection motion.
In the first part of this article, we considered the effect of section 365(d)(4) and other Bankruptcy Code sections on retailer debtors and their respective landlords, as well as on how retailer debtors can utilize the holiday sales season to implement a successful reorganization.
Despite the prevalence of first-lien/secondlien structures in the loan market over the course of the recently-ended leveraged transaction cycle, fully-litigated cases interpreting the provisions of first-lien/second-lien intercreditor agreements remain something of a rarity. As a result, cases providing guidance on the extent to which customary waivers included in such intercreditor agreements would be enforced are always welcomed by finance practitioners. It comes as no surprise then, that the decision of Judge Peck of the U.S.
In In re City of Vallejo,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California held recently that the City of Vallejo has the authority to reject its collective bargaining agreements with the city’s firefighters and electrical workers as part of its chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding without going through the process detailed in section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court determined that a municipality does not need to comply with the stringent requirements that corporations face when seeking to reject a collective bargaining agreement (a “CBA”).
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has ruled that a creditor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, despite pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff. In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2009 WL 68873 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). The Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to mutual obligations between a debtor and a single nondebtor.
Introduction
In Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In re Oneida Ltd.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed whether a premium payment created by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”)2 for pension plans terminated as part of a chapter 11 restructuring is a pre-petition claim or a post-petition administrative expense. The Court held that the statutorily mandated premium payment was a contingent pre-petition claim and was discharged upon confirmation of the debtor’s plan.
January 8, 2008 A Delaware bankruptcy court decided on Friday that mortgage servicing rights could be severed from a mortgage loan repurchase agreement that fell within applicable safe harbors of the Bankruptcy Code, at least where the loans were transferred “servicing retained.” The decision isCalyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp., et al. (In re American Home Mortgage Corp.), Bankr. Case No. 07-51704 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 4, 2008).
On January 14, 2014, Judge Robert E. Gerber of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in Weisfelner v. Fund 1. (In re Lyondell Chemical Co.), Adv. Proc. No. 10-4609 (REG), 2014 WL 118036 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan.
On August 28, 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas vacated a series of bankruptcy court rulings that had blocked Vitro SAB’s noteholders from filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Vitro’s non-debtor subsidiary guarantors. In a decision authored by Chief Judge Sidney A.
On May 4, 2012, Judge J. Paul Oetken of the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York held that the Bankruptcy Court has the injunctive power to enforce the automatic stay against entities falling within the Bankruptcy Court’s in personam jurisdiction, and that, in this case, the enforcement of the automatic stay did not violate interests of comity. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), No. 11 Civ. 8629 (JPO), 2012 WL 1570859 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2012).