The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).
Shareholder of a Korean corporation (“Cuzco Korea”), the sole member of a chapter 11 limited liability company debtor (“Cuzco USA” or the “Debtor”), brought an adversary proceeding against the Debtor and others, asserting claims directly, derivatively on behalf of Cuzco Korea and “double derivatively” on behalf of the Debtor. On the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy court for the district of Hawaii was required to consider the impact of Korean law on the derivative claims as well as notions of forum non conveniens.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,1 recently held that a U.S. bankruptcy court is not required under principles of comity to blindly apply foreign law to assets located in the U.S. of a foreign debtor whose principal insolvency proceeding is outside the U.S. Instead, bankruptcy courts must balance the interests of the affected U.S. parties with the those of the foreign debtor. In this case, the balancing required the application of U.S. law to the foreign debtor’s U.S. assets, not German law as applied in the foreign proceeding.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on March 17, 2010 held that foreign representatives appointed in a foreign insolvency proceed-ing have the authority to bring a foreign law based avoidance action in an ancillary bankruptcy proceeding commenced under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, reversing the lower court opinions.
After Energy Future Holdings (EFH), maybe not so much. The size of the break-up fee approved by the bankruptcy court in EFH was undoubtedly large by any account – US$275 million. But it was approved following all necessary filings, notice and hearings. All parties and counsel involved were highly sophisticated and experienced. The court that approved the fee was the Delaware bankruptcy court, by all accounts one of the most experienced and sophisticated bankruptcy courts in the nation. And there wasn’t even a hint of fraud, misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York overseeing the Residential Capital (“ResCap”) cases issued an opinion on November 15, 2013 (the “Opinion”)2 allowing the unamortized interest associated with original issue discount (“OID”) that was generated in a fair market value exchange and claimed by ResCap’s junior secured noteholders (the “Holders”). While the OID ruling is only one component of the Opinion,3 it may have far reaching implications, as already evidenced in the pricing of other OID notes that were the product of fair market value exchanges.
A recent decision in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) in the Lehman case has extended the unenforceability of ipso facto clauses to a provision triggered by the bankruptcy filing of an affiliate of a contractual party.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed a trial court judgment holding a bank and its principal in contempt and sanctioning them for violating a bankruptcy discharge injunction, based on the findings in a parallel state court proceeding.
In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit held that the state court judgment did not preclude the bankruptcy court’s ability to enforce its own orders.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that certain deposits and wire transfers into a bankrupt debtor’s personal, unrestricted checking account in the ordinary course of business were not “transfers” under § 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code, affirming the district court’s and bankruptcy court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the bank in an adversary proceeding brought by the bankruptcy trustee.
A recent decision from a United States Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Illinois provides a detailed analysis of why proofs of claim on “time-barred” debt do not violate the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) or the Bankruptcy Code. The decision, Glenn v. Cavalry Investments, LLC, is among the growing number of decisions rejecting Crawford v. LVNV from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.