U.S. federal courts have frequently been referred to as the “guardians of the Constitution.” Under Article III of the Constitution, federal judges are appointed for life by the U.S. president with the approval of the Senate. They can be removed from office only through impeachment and conviction by Congress. The first bill considered by the U.S. Senate—the Judiciary Act of 1789—divided the U.S. into what eventually became 12 judicial “circuits.” In addition, the court system is divided geographically into 94 “districts” throughout the U.S.

Participants in the multibillion-dollar market for distressed claims and securities had ample reason to keep a watchful eye on developments in the bankruptcy courts during each of the last three years. Controversial rulings handed down in 2005 and 2006 by the bankruptcy court overseeing the chapter 11 cases of failed energy broker Enron Corporation and its affiliates had traders scrambling for cover due to the potential that acquired claims/debt could be equitably subordinated or even disallowed, based upon the seller’s misconduct.

“Give ups” by senior classes of creditors to achieve confirmation of a plan have become an increasingly common feature of the chapter 11 process, as stakeholders strive to avoid disputes that can prolong the bankruptcy case and drain estate assets by driving up administrative costs.

Following the culmination of two public comment periods spanning more than a year, the Office of the United States Trustee, a unit of the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) assigned to oversee bankruptcy cases, issued new final guidelines on June 11 governing the payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses in large chapter 11 cases—cases with $50 million or more in assets and $50 million or more in liabilities.

Putting it mildly, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling last year in Stern v. Marshall, 132 S. Ct. 56 (2011), cast a wrench into the day-to-day operation of U.S. bankruptcy courts scrambling to deal with a deluge of challenges—strategic or otherwise—to the scope of their “core” jurisdiction to issue final orders and judgments on a wide range of disputes. In Stern, the Court ruled that, to the extent that 28 U.S.C.

When a company that has been designated a responsible party for environmental cleanup costs files for bankruptcy protection, the ramifications of the filing are not limited to a determination of whether the remediation costs are dischargeable claims. Another important issue is the circumstances under which contribution claims asserted by parties coliable with the debtor will be allowed or disallowed in the bankruptcy case. This question was the subject of rulings handed down early in 2011 by the New York bankruptcy court presiding over the chapter 11 cases of Lyondell Chemical Co.

As a general rule, absent an express agreement to the contrary, expenses associated with administering the bankruptcy estate, including pledged assets, are not chargeable to a secured creditor’s collateral or claim but must be paid out of the estate’s unencumbered assets. Recognizing, however, that the bankruptcy estate may be called upon to bear significant expense in connection with preserving or disposing of encumbered assets as part of an overall reorganization (or liquidation) strategy, U.S.

The ability to borrow money during the course of a bankruptcy case is an important tool available to a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”). Often times, the debtor’s most logical choice for a lender is one with an existing pre-bankruptcy relationship with the debtor. As a condition to making new loans, however, lenders commonly require the debtor to waive its right to pursue avoidance or lender liability actions against the lender based upon pre-bankruptcy events.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

On January 10, 2012, a Florida bankruptcy court ruled in In re Pearlman, 462 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012), that substantive consolidation is purely a bankruptcy remedy and that it accordingly did not have the power to consolidate the estate of a debtor in bankruptcy with the assets and affairs of a nondebtor. In so ruling, the court staked out a position on a contentious issue that has created a widening rift among bankruptcy and appellate courts regarding the scope of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over nondebtor entities.