October 17, 2012, will mark the seven-year anniversary of the effective date of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was enacted as part of the comprehensive bankruptcy reforms implemented under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.
In a much anticipated opinion,In re TOUSA, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 1673910 (11th Cir. May 15, 2012), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has resolved a disagreement between the Bankruptcy Court and District Court for the Southern District of Florida by upholding the Bankruptcy Court’s findings—to the chagrin of lenders, who are now arguably exposed to new liabilities and higher standards of due diligence.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently found that a debtor’s transfer of property owned by a corporation in which the debtor allegedly held a 50% interest did not automatically constitute a transfer of assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. After the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the Chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary complaint alleging that the debtor purposefully had executed a post-petition mortgage lien on certain real property owned by a corporation of which the debtor was a 50% owner.
On May 4, 2012, Judge J. Paul Oetken of the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York held that the Bankruptcy Court has the injunctive power to enforce the automatic stay against entities falling within the Bankruptcy Court’s in personam jurisdiction, and that, in this case, the enforcement of the automatic stay did not violate interests of comity. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), No. 11 Civ. 8629 (JPO), 2012 WL 1570859 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2012).
In Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in which the Bankruptcy Court avoided the liens given by TOUSA’s subsidiaries to new lenders and permitted the recovery of the proceeds of the new loan from other TOUSA lenders that had taken the funds in repayment of their TOUSA guaranteed loans.
On May 14, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey that the fair market value of a creditor’s collateral as of the plan’s confirmation date is the proper method of valuing a secured creditor’s claim pursuant to section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Third Circuit also adopted a “burden-shifting framework,” finding that a secured creditor will bear the ultimate burden of proving the extent to which its claims are secured pursuant to section 506(a).
Background
Today, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its much awaited decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. ______ (2012). The noteworthy decision resolves any uncertainty surrounding a secured creditor’s right to credit bid in a sale under a chapter 11 plan which arose after cases like Philadelphia Newspapers 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010) curtailed the right.
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that debtors may not obtain confirmation of a Chapter 11 cramdown plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of a creditor’s lien but does not permit the creditor to credit-bid at the sale. InRadlax Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v.
On May 15, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that security interests and liens granted by subsidiaries of a borrower to refinance obligations owed to the borrower’s lenders constituted fraudulent transfers under section 548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code in the borrower’s and subsidiaries’ bankruptcy cases.Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), 2012 WL 1673910 (11th Cir. 2012).
Nearly a year has passed since the Supreme Court held, in Stern v. Marshall,1 that bankruptcy courts may not determine a potentially broad range of “private rights” disputes arising in bankruptcy proceedings. Lower courts have grappled with the practical implications of Stern, but it is not yet clear whether the decision will ultimately result in a significant curtailment of bankruptcy court power or prove narrower in application.