The Bankruptcy Code impairs lenders’ rights in various ways. Accordingly, lenders have long attempted to devise methods of preventing borrowers from filing for bankruptcy protection. Such attempts generally have not been successful -- courts hold that as a general matter, a borrower’s pre bankruptcy waiver of the right to file bankruptcy is against public policy and is void. See, e.g., Klingman v. Levinson,831 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.3 (7th Cir.
Three months ago, the U.S. District Court in Delaware upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc., which limited, for “cause,” the amount that the purchaser of a secured lender’s claim could credit bid in connection with an asset sale under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Finds Bankruptcy Court to be Proper Forum for Claim Objection Despite Forum Selection Clauses in Investor Agreements
The Southern District of New York recently reiterated the critical difference between creditor claims and equity interests in the bankruptcy context. In a recent opinion arising out of the Arcapita Bank bankruptcy case, the Court was faced with an objection to a proof of claim filed by an investor, Captain Hani Alsohaibi, who characterized his right to recovery against the debtors as being based on a “corporate investment.”
Before the Supreme Court this term is the question of whether a beneficiary individual retirement account (an “Inherited IRA”) is exempt from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C) and (d)(12)2 of the Bankruptcy Code. The issue turns on 1) whether the funds in an Inherited IRA are “retirement funds,” and 2) whether an Inherited IRA is considered tax exempt under the Internal Revenue Code (the “Tax Code”).
On Monday, May 29, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved Sbarro LLC’s plan of reorganization, paving the way for the pizza restaurant chain to exit bankruptcy. Sbarro filed for chapter 11 protection earlier this year with a prepackaged plan that allowed its prepetition secured lenders to swap over $148 million in debt for control of the reorganized business if higher or otherwise better purchasers for Sbarro’s business did not overbid. When no alternative purchasers materialized, Sbarro moved forward with its debt-for-equity swap
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on April 27, 2014, issued a decision directing the bankruptcy court to dismiss fraudulent transfer complaints brought by the Madoff Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”) trustee against investment funds, their customers and individuals when the trustee failed “plausibly [to] allege that defendant[s] did not act in good faith.” SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 2014 WL 1651952, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. April 27, 2014).
Why it matters
It has not taken long for another bankruptcy court to question the propriety of allowing secured creditors to credit bid their loans. You may recall that in the case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor’s ability to credit bid based on self-serving testimony from a competing bidder that it would not participate in an auction absent the court capping the secured creditor’s credit bid.
Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.1 In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w
In a novel decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in its ruling In re Emoral, Inc., 740 F.3d 875 (3d Cir. 2014), that personal injury claims of individuals allegedly harmed by a bankrupt debtor’s products cannot be asserted against a pre-petition purchaser of the debtor’s assets, as they are “generalized claims” which belong to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate rather than to the individuals who suffered the harm.
Background