Absolute Priority has regularly covered the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall on the world of bankruptcy litigation.  In Stern, the Supreme Court held that Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits bankruptcy courts from finally adjudicating certain “core” causes of action (often called “Stern claims”), notwithstanding Congress’s explicit grant of such power to the bankruptcy court.

Readers may recall that, according to at least one bankruptcy court, chapter 9 debtors are not required to obtain bankruptcy court approval of compromises and settlements.

As bankruptcy practitioners will recall, the Supreme Court held in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) that bankruptcy courts, as non-Article III courts, “lack[] the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim,” even though Congress had classified these types of proceedings as core – and thus authorized federal bankruptcy courts to hear and decide them.

The case of Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), No. 12- 1200, was easily one of the most closely watched bankruptcy cases in many years. Last week’s decision in that case, however, was far less dramatic than  some practitioners feared it might be. The Supreme Court answered two important questions regarding the power of bankruptcy courts that it left open three years ago in Stern v. Marshall.

On June 9, 2014, in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.),1 a much-anticipated decision, the Supreme Court addressed how bankruptcy courts should adjudicate so-called Stern claims. Stern claims are “core” claims over which bankruptcy courts have statutory authority to enter orders and judgments,2 but which authority the Supreme Court previously held in Stern v. Marshall3 was not permitted (at least with respect to certain issues) under Article III of the United States Constitution.

In Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, Chapter 7 Trustee of Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., — U.S. — (June 9, 2014) (Bellingham), the Supreme Court shed light on how bankruptcy judges must proceed when confronted with claims that they cannot finally adjudicate as non-Article III judges.  

The First Circuit held in a recent decision that bankruptcy courts have wide discretion to apply a flexible approach when valuing (and potentially re-valuing) collateral for purposes of determining whether a secured creditor is oversecured and therefore entitled to receive postpetition interest pursuant to section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.   

The Stern v. Marshall Decision. In its 2011 decision in Stern v. Marshall, decided by a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court held that even though Congress designated certain state law counterclaims as “core” proceedings, Article III of the U.S. Constitution prohibits bankruptcy courts from finally adjudicating those claims. Stern v.

On June 9, 2014, the United States Supreme Court addressed an issue left open in Stern v. Marshall.¹ Instead of bringing clarity to procedural confusion created by Stern, the Court’s opinion in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v.

On Monday, the Supreme Court confirmed¹ that bankruptcy courts may hear “Stern-type” matters (such as tortious interference counterclaims) that relate to bankruptcy proceedings, so long as a district court reviews the bankruptcy court’s proposed findings and renders the final decision. Other questions left in the wake of Stern v. Marshall,² however, remain unanswered and will continue to occupy the attention of parties to bankruptcy matters and courts alike.

BACKGROUND: IN THE WAKE OF STERN V. MARSHALL