In a case of first impression, DLA Piper argued before the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware that a consent provision in a Delaware LLC operating agreement effectively granting a creditor a veto right over a debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy was void because it was contrary to federal public policy.
Who doesn’t love a good catch-all provision? In a world of infinite possibilities, attorneys often find themselves drafting language designed to encompass a plethora of contingencies. Are such efforts sometimes overkill? Perhaps. Nevertheless, given our imperfect ability to predict the future, such provisions are often necessary and appropriate.
For those interested in a quick read with some juicy facts and egregious acts by the relevant practitioners, check out the recent opinion in Church Joint Venture, L.P. v. Blasingame (In re Blasingame), where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an order denying approval of a proposed settlement agreement was not a final order susceptible to appeal as of right.
I. Introduction
Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) § 108 excludes cancellation of indebtedness income (“COD income”, i.e.
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
A recent decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas caught our eye because of the unconventional opening line:
“Summers are hot in Texas, so pools are a hot item. But not hot enough to help a pool installer [ . . . ] avoid bankruptcy” – Judge Tony M. Davis, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
As an example of the conflicting and contrasting court rulings on the effect of surrender in bankruptcy (see our prior update), the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fifth District, recently dismissed a borrower’s appeal from a final judgment of foreclosure because the borrower admitted during the course of his bankruptcy proceeding that he owed the mortgage debt and stated his intention to surrender the mortgage
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a creditor’s motion to compel the debtor to surrender mortgaged property and also denied the debtor’s motion to stay the case, holding that a chapter 7 debtor who indicates surrender of real property in his statement of intention is not obligated to surrender that property to the lienholder, whether or not the property is administered by the chapter 7 trustee.
In In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, the question before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware was whether an investor who “bought and paid for [one] Common Unit (including all rights related thereto),”