On June 14, 2016, Judge Thuma of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico issued a memorandum opinion holding that a debtor could reject a prepetition settlement agreement that was determined to be executory in nature.

Reversing a bankruptcy court order in favor of the debtor, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland recently held that a bank that had allowed amounts to be withdrawn from a home equity credit line after the HELOC had been frozen could still recover those amounts from the debtor.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. June 23, 2016)

The bankruptcy court applies Kentucky’s borrowing statute, KRS § 413.320, to determine the applicable statute of limitations for the debtor’s defamation, breach of contract, and fraud claims. The court analyzes where each claim accrued and dismisses some but not all of the debtor’s claims. Opinion below.

Judge: Wise

Attorney for Debtor: Dann Law Firm, Brian D. Flick

Attorney for Defendants: Christopher M. Hill, John R. Wirthlin, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Patricia K. Burgess, Stephanie Smiley

Ever since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Insurance Co. in 1928, it has been well-settled that a policyholder can compromise a disputed claim with its insurer for less than the full limits of the policy without putting its rights to excess coverage at risk.

Claims disputes are “core proceedings” in bankruptcy cases that are subject to the general jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, subject to exceptions for personal injury tort or wrongful death claims. Under 28 U.S.C.

In a case of first impression, DLA Piper argued before the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware that a consent provision in a Delaware LLC operating agreement effectively granting a creditor a veto right over a debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy was void because it was contrary to federal public policy.

Who doesn’t love a good catch-all provision? In a world of infinite possibilities, attorneys often find themselves drafting language designed to encompass a plethora of contingencies. Are such efforts sometimes overkill? Perhaps. Nevertheless, given our imperfect ability to predict the future, such provisions are often necessary and appropriate.

For those interested in a quick read with some juicy facts and egregious acts by the relevant practitioners, check out the recent opinion in Church Joint Venture, L.P. v. Blasingame (In re Blasingame), where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an order denying approval of a proposed settlement agreement was not a final order susceptible to appeal as of right.

I. Introduction

Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) § 108 excludes cancellation of indebtedness income (“COD income”, i.e.