On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, that a Bankruptcy Judge lacked constitutional authority to issue a final ruling on state law counterclaims by a debtor against a claimant. This is the latest round of a well-known case involving the estate of former model Anna Nicole Smith and the estate of her late husband, wealthy oil magnate J. Howard Marshall.
Two decades ago, the Supreme Court tackled the issue of whether a third party had submitted itself to jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,1 the Supreme Court ruled that a party who has not filed a claim against a bankrupt's estate is not subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. A year later, in Langenkamp v.
Part One of this article, published in the last edition of the Restructuring Review, examined recent developments in the gaming industry, focusing on strategies employed by gaming companies to increase liquidity and avoid insolvency. Part Two focuses on how potential buyers can use the bankruptcy process to purchase gaming facilities, free and clear of prior liens, and describes certain complications inherent in the acquisition of this type of asset.
Acquiring Gaming Facilities through Chapter 11
Sale Process
This week, Representative John Conyers introduced the “Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009” (H.R. 1106) (the “Act”), which has been circulated in advance of a vote by the House of Representatives anticipated as early as today. Additional amendments have been offered to the bill, but it is unclear which, if any, will be incorporated into the final text. It is not expected that the Senate will consider its version of the bill until mid-March.
In COR Route 5 Co. v. Penn Traffic Co.1 (In re Penn Traffic Co), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a non-debtor party to an executory contract may not, by fulfilling its contractual obligations post-petition, deprive the debtor of its ability to reject an executory contract.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.
On September 18, in an en banc review, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overruled, in part, seminal casesBarger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) and Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002), adopting a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis when facing questions of judicial estoppel.
Olsen v. Heaver (In re Heaver), 473 B.R. 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) –
The short story is that when a deed and mortgage are executed at the same time, but the mortgage is recorded before the deed, the recorded mortgage does not provide constructive notice and can be avoided in a bankruptcy – at least under Illinois law as interpreted by the Heaver bankruptcy court.
In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.
Reprinted with permission from the September 14, 2017 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. © 2017 ALM Media Properties, LLC. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. All rights reserved.