The importance and practical benefits resulting from the use of the same in-house counsel for an entire corporate family are numerous. For example, the in-house attorneys are particularly familiar with the corporate family’s structure, can assist with joint public filings, and can expertly oversee the corporate family’s compliance with regulatory regimes. If a subsidiary in the corporate family becomes financially distressed, however, the creditors of the financially distressed entity may look to the parent corporation for recourse.

In the chapter 1 1 cases of Adelphia Communications Corporation and its subsidiaries, Adelphia sought to assume and assign more than 2,000 franchise agreements in connection with the proposed transfer of its cable operations to affiliates of Comcast Corporation and Time Warner Cable. Numerous local franchising authorities objected, arguing, among other things, that they had a right of first refusal under the agreements, and in some cases also under a local ordinance, to purchase the franchise on substantially the same terms and conditions.

Two circuit courts of appeal recently addressed whether a company filing chapter 11 for the sole purpose of retaining vital leases did so in good faith. In In re Capitol Food of Fields Corner, the First Circuit, in a matter of first impression on the issue of chapter 11’s implied good-faith filing requirement, declined to address the broader question, concluding that even if there is a good-faith filing requirement, a prima facie showing of bad faith could not be met because the debtor articulated several legitimate reasons for the necessity of reorganizing under chapter 11.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that a debtor may not reduce the number of votes required to confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization by purchasing certain claims. Such vote “gerrymandering” resulted in an unconfirmable plan, the court ruled. In re Machne Menachem, Inc., 233 Fed. Appex. 119, 2007 WL 1157015 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2007 (Pa.)).

While Bankruptcy Code section 105 grants broad powers to issue injunctions, most bankruptcy courts are reluctant to enjoin litigation in other venues. A recent ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit follows this trend, reversing a preliminary injunction issued by a bankruptcy court staying arbitration proceedings between two nondebtor parties.

However, the Ninth Circuit also articulated specific standards for when such a section 105 injunction may be obtained. In re Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086, 2007 WL 2555941 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2007).

For more than 10 years, the courts in New Jersey were split as to whether, under the Bankruptcy Code, a chapter 13 debtor’s right to cure a default on a mortgage loan secured by the debtor’s primary residence expired at the foreclosure sale, or at the time the deed to the foreclosed property was delivered to the purchaser. That split now has been resolved by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in favor of the line of cases cutting off the right to cure at the time of the foreclosure sale. In re Connors, No. 06-3321 (3d Cir., Aug. 3, 2007).

Congress enacted amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2005 designed to increase certainty in the marketplace for mortgage loan repurchase agreements and other financial contracts.1 The contours – and limits – of these amendments were recently explored by the Delaware bankruptcy court in Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp.

In UPS Capital Business Credit v. Gencarelli (In re Gencarelli),1 the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a secured creditor is entitled to collect a prepayment penalty from a solvent debtor. The Court found that the secured creditor could collect the penalty, whether or not it is reasonable, so long as the penalty is enforceable under state law. The Court reasoned that any other holding would leave open the possibility that an unsecured creditor could recover more from a solvent estate than a secured creditor.

Background

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.

In an important recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, testing the outer reaches of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, In re Johns Manville Corp., 06-2099 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2008), the court considered whether claims that are not derivative of a debtor’s liability, but rather seek to recover directly from an insurer for its own alleged misconduct, can be enjoined by the “channeling” mechanism developed by the bankruptcy court.