The U.S. Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision on June 28, 2011, held that Bankruptcy Code § 546(e), which exempts a “Settlement Payment” from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoiding powers, insulated two sellers of Enron Corporation’s commercial paper from suit despite Enron’s early pre- bankruptcy redemption. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., ___F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011) (2-1).

On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in the Stern v.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in In Re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir., June 28, 2011). In the closely watched case, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit’s decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010), holding instead that secured lenders have the right to credit bid in “free and clear” asset sales where their liens are being stripped, whether those sales occur under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or under a chapter 11 plan.

In a significant decision that reinforced the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior plurality decision in Marathon, the Court determined that while bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority to hear state-law compulsory counterclaims to a creditor’s proof of claim under section 157(b)(2)(C) of Title 28, Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires such proceedings to be heard by Article III judges where they would not be resolved as part of the claims allowance process.

Debtors filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7.  The Debtors own and have title to real property ("Property").  Prior to the Petition Date, the husband borrowed $85,000 from Lender. This loan was reflected by a promissory note signed only by the husband, as "Borrower."  The term "Note" is defined in the Mortgage as the promissory note signed by Borrower.  On the same date, a mortgage granting Lender a mortgage on the Property was executed.

Introduction

On June 23, 2011, after fifteen years of hugely acrimonious litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States (the “Court”) issued a decision on a narrow legal issue that may end up significantly limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.  

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed decisions of the bankruptcy court and a federal district court that the purchaser of a bankrupt company’s assets cannot recover the costs of environmental remediation from an escrow account established as part of the purchase agreement.In re Evans Indus. Inc., No. 10-30387 (5th Cir. 6/21/11) (unpublished).

In a decision that may have significant practical implications to the practice of bankruptcy law, the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, on constitutional grounds, that a bankruptcy court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a debtor’s state law counterclaims, thus considerably limiting the ability of the bankruptcy court to fully and finally adjudicate claims in a bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179 (June 23, 2011).

Unless you’re not a sports fan or simply don’t follow Major League Baseball (MLB), you probably know that the Los Angeles Dodgers filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on Monday, June 27, 2011. (Delaware Bankruptcy Court, Case Number 11-12010.) According to Forbes magazine, the Dodgers are one of the most valuable baseball franchises in America. Nevertheless, the franchise hit hard times and filed for bankruptcy.