On June 23rd, the First Circuit addressed the priority of claims asserted by senior noteholders and junior noteholders of debt issued by an insolvent bank. It affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the parties did not intend for the senior noteholders to receive post-petition interest payments prior to the junior noteholders receiving a distribution. In re: Bank of New England Corporation, Debtor.  

Enron seems like ancient history but the Second Circuit has just issued an important decision in an Enron appeal confirming that the redemption of commercial paper made through DTC is entitled to the Bankruptcy Code § 546(e) exemption for “settlement payments” and, therefore, exempt from attack as preferential transfers. The Second Circuit held that this is so even though the Enron redemption payments were made prior to stated maturity, becoming the first Circuit Court of Appeal to address this issue. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V.

The U.S. Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision on June 28, 2011, held that Bankruptcy Code § 546(e), which exempts a “Settlement Payment” from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoiding powers, insulated two sellers of Enron Corporation’s commercial paper from suit despite Enron’s early pre- bankruptcy redemption. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., ___F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011) (2-1).

On June 28, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the views of the Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit and held that a reorganization plan which proposes the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens must honor the secured creditor’s right to credit bid its claim in order to be confirmed under the “fair and equitable” standard of the Bankruptcy Code. In the combined appeals of In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, et al. andIn re Radlax Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al.

On Thursday, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision ruled in Stern v. Marshall[1] that the congressional grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts to issue final judgments on counterclaims to proofs of claim was unconstitutional. For the litigants, this decision brought an end to an expensive and drawn out litigation between the estates of former Playboy model Anna Nicole Smith and the son of her late husband, Pierce Marshall, which Justice Roberts writing for the majority analogized to the fictional litigation in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House.

A Delaware bankruptcy judge recently held that a landlord's right of first refusal to purchase a debtor/tenant's liquor license (the "Option") was unenforceable since the debtor rejected the lease containing the Option1. Disagreeing with a ruling of the First Circuit Court of Appeals2, the Delaware court held that the Option provision was a non-severable part of an executory contract that was not subject to specific performance.

The Facts

On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in the Stern v.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in In Re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir., June 28, 2011). In the closely watched case, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit’s decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010), holding instead that secured lenders have the right to credit bid in “free and clear” asset sales where their liens are being stripped, whether those sales occur under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or under a chapter 11 plan.

In a significant decision that reinforced the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior plurality decision in Marathon, the Court determined that while bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority to hear state-law compulsory counterclaims to a creditor’s proof of claim under section 157(b)(2)(C) of Title 28, Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires such proceedings to be heard by Article III judges where they would not be resolved as part of the claims allowance process.