Companies that plan to sell goods or services to a debtor in bankruptcy should be aware of a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, holding that a trustee may avoid a debtor’s post-petition transfers of cash collateral if such transfers were made without the consent of the secured party or court order.1
On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit overruled longstanding precedent interpreting the definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), No. 09-1563, slip op., (3d Cir. June 2, 2010) an en banc panel rejected the state law accrual theory of claims recognition established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), in favor of the more widely followed conduct test theory.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying New York law, has held that an inadequate consideration exclusion unambiguously bars coverage for a lawsuit arising out of a debt restructuring transaction. Delta Financial Corp. v. Westchester Surplus Ins. Co. (In re Delta Financial Corp.), 2010 WL 1784054 (3d Cir. May 5, 2010).
A. United States v. Delfasco, Inc., 409 B.R. 704 (D. Del. July 15, 2009).
This suit involved a motion to withdraw from Bankruptcy Court to District Court. Defendant/Debtor Delfasco, Inc. (“Delfasco”) filed for Chapter 11 protection under the Bankruptcy Code following the EPA’s issuance of a RCRA Order requiring Delfasco to install and maintain mitigation systems for trichloroethylene that it discovered on its property. The United States, on behalf of the EPA, filed an Adversary Complaint against Delfasco, followed by this motion to withdraw.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently addressed an objection to the debtor-in-possession financing approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the bankruptcy of General Growth Properties.1 The District Court’s decision, which holds that reversal on appeal of an order approving DIP financing does not invalidate the financing or liens granted by the postpetition lenders, if provided in good faith also addresses both the timeliness of the appeal and the merits of the arguments raised therein, provides a detai
Introduction
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the District Court’s ruling in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC.1 The Court allowed Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC to require all-cash bids for the asset sale under their proposed plan. This precluded secured creditors from credit bidding, as long as the plan provided those creditors with the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of their claims.
Under BAPCPA, enacted in 2005, a Bankruptcy Court may not approve a Chapter 13 plan which does not provide for the payment of all unsecured claims in full if the plan does not devote all of the debtor’s projected disposable income over the life of the plan to repayment of the unsecured creditors.