In a recent case arising out of the bankruptcy of the Yellowstone Mountain Club, a private ski club for the ultrawealthy, Blixseth v. Brown (In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC) (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff needed the bankruptcy court’s permission to bring post-petition claims against the chair of Yellowstone’s Unsecured Creditors Committee (“UCC”).
Borrowers, agent banks, syndicate members and secondary market purchasers incur, syndicate, sell and buy bank debt on the assumption that bank debt is not a “security.” However, a June 30, 2016, opinion in the General Motors preference litigation1shows that such an assumption may no longer be valid, at least under the Bankruptcy Code.
A lender cannot rely on its subjective intent in claiming that an otherwise properly filed UCC termination is ineffective, according to a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Put another way, if a lender authorizes a termination statement, the termination is valid upon filing such UCC-3 even if the authorization was mistakenly given. While this result is not surprising, it does put lenders (and their counsel) on notice to be diligent in reviewing and authorizing the filing of UCC termination statements.
On August 27, 2007, United States District Judge Shira Scheindlin held that Springfield Associates, an innocent transferee of a claim from Citigroup against Enron, was not subject to certain counterclaims and defenses so long as Springfield was a “purchaser” and not an “assignee” of the claim. See In re Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs. L.L.C., No. 07 Civ. 1957, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63129 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007).
On May 23, 2008, in American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Inc.(In re American Home Mortgage Corp.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that BBB-rated mortgagebacked notes are eligible for the Bankruptcy Code’s repurchase agreement safe harbor as “interests in mortgage loans”.
In a May 23, 2008 decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that BBB-rated mortgage-backed notes are eligible for the Bankruptcy Code's repurchase agreement safe harbor as “interests in mortgage loans”. The court also held that a repurchase agreement constituted a sale, as opposed to a financing governed by UCC Article 9 -- the first decision on this topic since the financial contract safe harbors were expanded under the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.
Ring v. First Niagara Bank, N.A. (In re Sterling United, Inc.), 519 B.R. 586 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2014) –
A chapter 7 trustee sought to recover as preferences payments made by the debtor to a lender and proceeds of collateral liquidation received by the lender based on arguments regarding whether UCC financing statements adequately perfected the lender’s security interests.
Crews v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Crews), 477 B.R. 835 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 2012) –
A mortgaged building was destroyed by fire prior to the mortgagor’s bankruptcy filing. In an earlier opinion the bankruptcy court held in that the mortgagee had an equitable lien on the fire insurance proceeds of $350,000. This opinion addresses the debtors’ attempt to avoid the equitable lien using their “strong arm” powers.
Grogan v. Harvest Capital Co. (In re Grogan), 476 B.R. 270 (Bankr. D. Or. 2012) –
In Grogan, the debtors planted and harvested Christmas trees. The bankruptcy court was called upon to determine whether the debtors could exercise their “strong arm” powers under Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to trump the liens of two of their lenders on the Christmas trees.
Back in the mists of time, a seller that had a valid reclamation claim but was denied the return of its goods was entitled to an administrative expense claim (a claim with a higher priority than a general unsecured claim and thus a better chance of getting paid) or a lien on the debtor’s assets. The 2005 amendment to § 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code changed all that by stripping away those alternative remedies.