Under Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor or trustee can sell estate assets “free and clear of any interest” in such assets. This short, simple string of six words represents one of the most powerful tools in the bankruptcy professional’s arsenal.
The scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain financial contracts has been tested again, this time in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The question this time was whether an ipso facto provision continues to be safe harbored if enforcement of that provision is conditioned on other factors – in this case, the debtor’s failure to perform under the contract.
Imagine a creditor filing a claim in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case where neither the debtor nor the bankruptcy trustee objects to the claim. Imagine the chapter 13 plan is confirmed, including the claimed debt, though the creditor receives little to nothing in return for its claim. Can the debtor later bring a separate action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act or does res judicata bar the FDCPA claim?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.1 The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles. GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered a decision in the General Motors bankruptcy case that found an exception to the “free and clear” language of Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code2 where adequate notice of the sale order is not provided.3 However, the exception may not be far reaching due to the “peculiar” facts of the case.
Factual Background and Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court again will be addressing the powers of bankruptcy courts. At the end of the term, the Court granted certiorari in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. to decide whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a way that violates the statutory priority scheme in the Bankruptcy Code. No. 15-649, 2016 WL 3496769 (S. Ct. June 28, 2016). The Supreme Court is expected to address this fundamental bankruptcy issue sometime early next year.
Background
On July 25, 2016, Judge Kevin Carey of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued a thorough decision pursuant to a motion for judgment on the pleadings analyzing the intersection of a preference defendant’s post-petition administrative claim and their preference exposure. A copy of the Opinion is available here.
Parties to an appeal who condition a settlement on the vacating of the lower court’s judgment “may still [have] an appropriate remedy,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on July 12, 2016. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., 2016 U.S. App LEXIS 12813, *15 (11th Cir. July 12, 2016). Reversing the district court’s “narrow” refusal to vacate its judgment after the parties had settled, the Eleventh Circuit found that “exceptional circumstances” warranted the vacatur. Id., at *3, *14.
(7th Cir. July 26, 2016)
The Seventh Circuit interprets a Wisconsin exemption statute applicable to annuity contracts. The statute provides that such a contract is exempt from assets available to creditors so long as it “complies with the provisions of the internal revenue code.” The trustee argued for a narrow interpretation of this language, while the Court ultimately agrees with the broader interpretation of the statute employed by Wisconsin bankruptcy courts. Opinion below.
Judge: Hamilton
Attorney for Debtors: Dewitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Craig E. Stevenson