Among the required elements of a claim to avoid a preferential transfer under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is that, if the creditor-transferee were permitted to retain a pre-bankruptcy payment, it would end up being paid more than it would receive in a hypothetical liquidation of the debtor under chapter 7, assuming the transfer did not occur. This requirement and a defense to preference liability predicated on it—the "Kiwi defense"—were the subject of a ruling handed down by a Delaware bankruptcy court. In Pirinate Consulting Grp., LLC v. C. R. Meyer & Sons Co.

The Bottom Line

The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “requires the use of replacement value rather than a hypothetical [foreclosure] value … that the reorganization is designed to avoid,” held a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 26, 2017.

The Bottom Line

The Delaware District Court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision that the combination of a narrow arbitration provision and the bankruptcy court’s reservation of jurisdiction warranted denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The specific language of the arbitration provision, combined with the use of an accounting term of art, narrowed the scope of the arbitration provision sufficiently to rebut the presumption of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

What Happened?

Just one year after Lyondell Chemical Company (Lyondell) and Basell AF (Basell) consummated a nearly $20 billion merger of their businesses, the merged business of LyondellBasell Industries (LBI) “failed in a colossal manner.”1 As part of the bankruptcy process that followed, a court-appointed litigation trust (the Trust) filed suit for the benefit of unsecured creditors against numerous parties involved in the merger, bringing actual a

U.S. courts generally agree that the substantive consolidation should be applied sparingly, and even more so when substantive consolidation of debtors with non-debtors is sought. While many opinions address the grounds for substantive consolidation, very few cases address standing and notice issues when the sought for consolidation is of non-debtor entities. The Oklahoma bankruptcy court recently addressed these two issues in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Stewart.

“You have been served” – the famous phrase uttered by process servers everywhere, may never be heard by a bankruptcy defendant.

Why?

The United States Supreme Court recently held that a creditor who files a bankruptcy claim on a time-barred debt does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). SeeMidland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017). In the case, the debtor filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the creditor filed a proof of claim asserting that it was owed credit card debt. However, the credit card had not been used in over ten years, outside Alabama’s six-year statute of limitations.

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Merit Management Group L.P. v. FTI Consulting Inc. to resolve a circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.

In Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson), 2017 BL 101650 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the distinction between constitutional mootness (a jurisdictional issue that precludes court review of an appeal) and equitable mootness (which allows a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to hear an appeal under certain circumstances). The Eleventh Circuit ruled that an appeal from an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not constitutionally moot because an "actual case or controversy" existed.