Whether a provision in a bond indenture or loan agreement obligating a borrower to pay a “make-whole” premium is enforceable in bankruptcy has been the subject of heated debate in recent years. A Delaware bankruptcy court recently weighed in on the issue in Del. Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC (In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.), 527 B.R. 178 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).

BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING REVIEW VOL. 21 • NO. 4 JULY–AUGUST 2022 1 IN THIS ISSUE 1 U.S.

It is well recognized that, in keeping with the "fresh start" or "rehabilitative" policy, the Bankruptcy Code invalidates after-acquired property clauses in prepetition security agreements, but also includes an exception to the general rule for prepetition liens on the proceeds, products, offspring, or profits of prepetition collateral. Less well understood is that there is an "exception to the exception" if a bankruptcy court determines that the "equities of the case" suggest that property acquired by the estate should be free of such liens.

It is generally recognized that a bankruptcy court has the power—either equitable or statutory—to recharacterize a purported debt as equity if the substance of the transaction belies the labels the parties have given it. A ruling handed down by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York provides a textbook example of such a recharacterization. In In re Live Primary, LLC, 2021 WL 772248 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar.

In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-8-07102020, 2020 WL 3891501 (U.S.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently handed down three rulings potentially impacting bankruptcy cases.

Nunc Pro TuncRelief

In Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, No. 18-921, 2020 WL 871715 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020), the Court circumscribed the use of nunc pro tunc ("now for then") orders that make relief ordered by a court apply retroactively to an earlier point in time.

To encourage creditors, equity interest holders, indenture trustees and unofficial committees to take actions that benefit a bankruptcy estate, section 503(b)(3)(D) of the Bankruptcy Code confers administrative priority on their claims for expenses incurred in making a "substantial contribution" in a chapter 9 or chapter 11 case. Administrative expense status is also given under section 503(b)(4) to their claims for reimbursement of reasonable professional fees incurred in making a substantial contribution. The U.S.

In Momentive Performance Materials Inc. v. BOKF, NA (In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C.), 874 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2653 (2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a number of lower court rulings on hot-button bankruptcy issues, including allowance (or, in this case, denial) of a claim for a "make-whole" premium and contractual subordination of junior notes.

In Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Transwest Resort Properties Inc. (In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc.), 881 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered, in connection with a "cramdown" chapter 11 plan, whether an undersecured creditor's election to be treated as fully secured under section 1111(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code means that the plan must include a due-on-sale clause and whether the section 1129(a)(10) impaired class acceptance requirement applies on a "per plan" or a "per debtor" basis.

In Assured Guaranty Corp. v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 872 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code gave an unsecured creditors’ committee an "unconditional right to intervene," within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1), in an adversary proceeding commenced during the course of a bankruptcy case.