Where an insured has assigned away its rights to recover available insurance, the insured’s “empty shoes” do not necessarily prevent an excess carrier that pays defense costs rightfully owed by primary carriers from pursuing the primary carriers based a contractual subrogation theory. An excess carrier proceeding on this basis typically “stands in the shoes of the insured,” obtaining only those rights held by the insured. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found last week that where an excess carrier picks up the bill for an insured’s defense, it may recover fr
Alerts and Updates
The Third Circuit’s ruling in In re Tribune provides important insight on what it means for a plan to unfairly discriminate.
This is a favorable decision for commercial secured lenders. Although the ruling is not controlling on other bankruptcy courts as it is a trial court level ruling, courts may certainly consider it when presented with similar issues.
In In re 1111 Myrtle Avenue Group, LLC (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019), a New York bankruptcy court held that a default interest rate provision of 7 percent was enforceable and not a penalty against a debtor, which retained significant equity postbankruptcy.
Background
Recently, in a split (2-1) decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York’s decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 111 F. Supp.3d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Marblegate II”). The Second Circuit held in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., No. 15-2124, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 782 (2d Cir. Jan.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a secured party can perfect its lien on certain of a debtor's assets by the filing of a UCC-1 financing statement. However, Section 9-509 of the UCC provides that a party may file such a financing statement only if the debtor authorizes the filing: either expressly in an authenticated record or, more commonly, by executing a security agreement. The UCC does not specify when a debtor must provide such authorization, but the U.S.
In Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, petitioner vs. Peter H. Arkison, Chapter 7 Trustee, Case No. 12-1200, 573 U.S. __(2014) the United States Supreme Court ( Court) delivered its opinion as a follow up to its landmark decision in Stern v. Marshall. In Stern v.
On February 8, 2012, the Pennsylvania Insurance Department (the “Department”) announced that the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court approved its petition to liquidate First Sealord Surety Insurance.
According to the Department's Commissioner, Michael Consedine, the Department petitioned the Commonwealth Court for a liquidation order because “First Sealord Surety is no longer able to meet its policyholder obligations or pay its debts as they come due.”
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Mexican courts were closed for the past few months and only received urgent cases.
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a negative impact on the Mexican economy. As a result, Mexican courts have seen a rise in insolvency cases, which are not as common in Mexico compared to other jurisdictions, such as the United States. The rise of insolvency cases imposes new challenges to Mexican courts and Mexico’s laws.
The Revel decision provides a cautionary tale for purchasers under Section 363.
In its recent decision in Tempnology LLC, n/k/a Old Cold, LLC v. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. (In re Tempnology LLC), No. 15-065 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Nov. 18, 2016), the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (“the BAP”) rejected the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir.