The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the relative priority of claims against a debtor and the waterfall in which such claims are typically paid. In order for a court to confirm a plan over a dissenting class of creditors – what is commonly called a “cram-down” – the Bankruptcy Code demands thateither (i) the dissenting class receives the full value of its claim, or (ii) no classes junior to that class receive any property under the plan on account of their junior claims or interests. This is known as the “absolute priority rule.”

On October 7, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) vacated, as moot, two FERC orders asserting concurrent jurisdiction to review the disposition of certain Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation (“PG&E”) power purchase agreements (“PPAs”) that PG&E sought to reject through bankruptcy. In a brief memorandum decision, a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel explained that the orders had become moot when the bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan that had PG&E assume, rather than reject, the PPAs.

On March 27, Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz clarified that Executive Order 20-20, which directed Minnesota residents to stay at home, applies to debt collection professionals. Due to ongoing coronavirus (“COVID-19”) concerns, Executive Order 20-20, which will remain in effect until April 10, 2020, orders all persons living in the State of Minnesota to stay at home except to engage in exempted activities and critical sector work.

On June 7, 2019, Judge Dennis Montali of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of California San Francisco Division found that FERC’s finding that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the U.S. bankruptcy court over wholesale power agreements was “unenforceable in bankruptcy court and of no force on the parties before it.” Judge Montali further noted that if necessary, the U.S. bankruptcy court will “enjoin FERC from perpetuating its attempt to exercise power it wholly lacks.” At issue, on review by the bankruptcy court, was whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan cannot modify the rights of a secured creditor whose claim is only secured by an “interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” On December 6, the Eleventh Circuit held that this provision prevents the discharge of a mortgage in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, regardless of whether the plan “provided for” the mortgage or whether the mortgagee filed a proof of claim.

WTE-S&S AG Enters., LLC v. GHD, Inc., 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2343 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. August 18, 2017)

In re Ramz Real Estate Co., LLC, 510 B.R. 712 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) –

An undersecured mortgagee objected to a debtor’s proposed plan of reorganization on several grounds, including that (1) the plan was not approved by a proper impaired class and (2) retention of equity by the debtor’s members violated the absolute priority rule.

In re Sky Ventures, LLC, 523 B.R. 163 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2014) –

After a debtor obtained court approval to retroactively reject a lease as of the bankruptcy filing date, the landlord moved to reset the rejection date and for allowance of an administrative expense priority claim for post-petition rent.

In re Triple A & R Inv., Inc., 519 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. P.R. 2014) –

A mortgagee moved for relief from the automatic stay based on the debtor’s prepetition consent to stay relief.  The debtor argued that a prepetition waiver was unenforceable.

First Am. Bank v. First Am. Transp. Title Ins. Co., 759 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2014) –

After a mortgagor filed bankruptcy, a lender brought claims under a ship mortgage insurance title policy. The lender appealed the district court’s determination of the amount due under the policy, contending that the court used the wrong date of valuation, miscalculated the value of one of the insured vessels, and improperly made certain deductions.