The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has ruled that a creditor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, despite pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff. In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2009 WL 68873 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). The Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to mutual obligations between a debtor and a single nondebtor.
In Mukamal v. Bakes,1 the trustee of two trusts created under a chapter 11 plan of reorganization filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) against the former directors and officers of the debtors, the dominant shareholders of the debtors and the debtors’ accounting firm, alleging, among other things, various breaches of fiduciary duties.
In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “U.S. Court”) exercised its abstention powers and dismissed an involuntary chapter 11 petition filed against an Argentine company, Compania de Alimentos Fargo, SA (“Fargo”).1 Fargo, a debtor in an insolvency proceeding in Argentina, had moved to dismiss the involuntary petition principally because its Argentine bankruptcy case was still pending.
Although almost eight years have lapsed since the chapter 11 cases of Tulsa, Oklahoma-based SemCrude L.P.
On April 1, 2013, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California ruled that the City of Stockton qualified to file for protection under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court’s decision on this issue serves as an important milestone for chapter 9 jurisprudence, clarifying the requirements for “good faith” negotiations and being “insolvent” as conditions to filing for chapter 9 protection. Significantly, the court held that a municipal debtor need not negotiate with all of its creditors, only those that it intends to impair.
After a final mediation session between Hostess and its unions failed to put Hostess’s reorganization back on track, Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain authorized the orderly wind down of Hostess’s operations. As a result, Hostess will prepare to sell its assets and shut down its factories. However, a purchaser may seek to restart the production of the beloved baked goods such as Twinkies, Ho-Hos and Donettes.
Judge Martin Glenn of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently ruled that Borders gift card holders did not qualify as “known creditors.” The Court concluded that the gift card holders were entitled only to publication notice rather than actual notice of the bar date for filing bankruptcy claims in Borders’ chapter 11 case.
On May 4, 2012 Judge Kevin J. Carey of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a claim against a debtor’s estate, transferred to a third party, is subject to the same infirmities as in the hands of the original holder of the claim. In re KB Toys, Inc., — B.R. —-, 2012 WL 1570755, at *11 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). Judge Carey’s opinion diverged from, and criticized, the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C., 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a proposed “gifting” plan distributing value from the second lien lenders to the prepetition equity holder violated the absolute priority rule and was confirmed in error.2 This decision, by a 2-1 panel vote,3 reversed the decisions of the Bankruptcy and District Courts for the Southern District of New York. The Second Circuit also affirmed unanimously the designation of the vote of an indirect competitor of the debtor that held no claims prior to the petition date.
Two decades ago, the Supreme Court tackled the issue of whether a third party had submitted itself to jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,1 the Supreme Court ruled that a party who has not filed a claim against a bankrupt's estate is not subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. A year later, in Langenkamp v.