The United States Supreme Court has agreed to address “[w]hether, under §365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-licensor’s ‘rejection’ of a license agreement—which ‘constitutes a breach of such contract,’ 11 U.S.C. §365(g)—terminates rights of the licensee that would survive the licensor’s breach under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” The appeal arises from a First Circuit decision, Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v.

In Nortel Networks, Inc., Case No. 09-0138(KG), Doc. No. 18001 (March 8, 2017), the Delaware Bankruptcy Court ruled on the objections of two noteholders who asked the Court to disallow more than $4.4 million of the $8.1 million of the fees sought by counsel to their indenture trustee. Given the detailed rulings announced by the Court, the decision may establish a number of guidelines by which future fee requests made by an indenture trustee’s professionals will be measured.

Matters Handled by the UCC

Lending credence to the old adage “if it’s too good to be true, then it probably is,” the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a secured lender was on inquiry notice of possible fraud by its borrower in impermissibly pledging customers’ assets to secure loans. And the penalty was steep—the Court determined the pledge to be a fraudulent transfer to the lender and the lender’s failure to act upon inquiry notice destroyed the lender’s good faith defense. As a result, the lender’s $300 million secured claim was reduced to a near-worthless general unsecured claim. 

The First Circuit Court of Appeals in In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6768 (1st Cir. Apr. 11, 2014) recently ruled on a number of issues critical to valuing a secured claim in bankruptcy. Specifically, the court 1) endorsed the use of a “flexible approach” to value collateral under the circumstances of this case, 2) recognized that the date collateral should be valued is the lender’s burden to prove, and 3) confirmed that the pre-petition agreement’s default interest rate should generally be used to determine the post-petition interest rate.

When a debtor rejects an executory contract, Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a licensee of intellectual property to retain certain rights under the rejected contract. An important question arises, therefore, whether a particular agreement indeed involves a license. In a recent decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has reaffirmed the definition of a license as “a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.” In re Spansion, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26131, *7 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2012) (citing De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v.

With the announcement today that the Swedish automaker Saab has filed for bankruptcy, we thought it timely to take a look at what happens to trademarks in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.  SAAB is the owner of nearly 100 U.S.

In a decision that may have significant practical implications to the practice of bankruptcy law, the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, on constitutional grounds, that a bankruptcy court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a debtor’s state law counterclaims, thus considerably limiting the ability of the bankruptcy court to fully and finally adjudicate claims in a bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179 (June 23, 2011).

Voyager Digital Assets Inc., along with two of its affiliates, filed bankruptcy petitions in the Southern District of New York on July 5, 2022. The filing is significant—it followed months of an extreme downturn in the cryptocurrency sector which led to the collapse of Three Arrows Capital, a Singaporean cryptocurrency hedge fund (that borrowed $350 million and 15,250 Bitcoins from Voyager).

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to disrupt businesses and markets, and companies begin to look to bankruptcy courts for relief from the resulting liquidity and operational distress, the issue of creditor and shareholder “blocking rights” seems likely to become an important topic as parties attempt to protect their investments.

A recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision provides insight into “bad faith” claims-buying activity; specifically whether a creditor’s purchase of claims for the express purpose of blocking plan confirmation is permissible. In In re Fagerdala USA-Lompoc, Inc., the Court found it was—the secured creditor did not act in bad faith when it purchased a subset of all general unsecured claims and voted those claims against confirmation because it was acting to further its own economic interest as a creditor, without some extrinsic ulterior motive.