In Auday v. Wet Sale Retail, Inc., the Sixth Circuit considered an action by a former individual debtor who sued for an age discrimination claim. The district court barred the plaintiff from litigating the claim because she failed to identify it as an asset in the bankruptcy court, and the claim had arisen by that point in time.

The term “frenemy” – a combination of the words friend and enemy – has emerged from modern vernacular to describe someone who is simultaneously a partner and an adversary. The term is perhaps perfectly emblematic of the restructuring process where various constituents make and break alliances in an effort to steer the restructuring process. In so doing, the lines between friend and enemy are often blurred or altered during the course of the restructuring.

In a recent order entered in In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525, the Delaware bankruptcy court (1) clarified the application of Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) to creditors’ priority claims arising from the delivery of goods in the 20 days before a bankruptcy filing and (2) amended a previously entered procedures order to allow for the resolution of disputed “Twenty Day Claims” on their merits.

The courts have long struggled with the question of whether particular orders entered by a bankruptcy court are final, and therefore appealable as a matter of right. It is generally recognized that a bankruptcy case is distinctly different from the usual civil case in that it is a framework within which a variety of disputes arise and are resolved. That distinction is recognized in 28 U.S.C. §158(d)(1), which provides that appeals as of right maybe taken not only from final judgments in cases but from “final judgments, orders, and decrees…in cases and proceedings….”

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a reorganization plan may be approved if (1) proposed in “good faith” under  § 1129(a)(3), and (2) accepted by at least one class of creditors whose interests are impaired by the plan, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). In Village Green I, GP v. Fed.

The Caesars’ bankruptcy case has garnered a great deal of attention throughout the year and has yielded a number of interesting and important opinions. The latest opinion of significance was issued on October 6, 2015 by the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

A recent English High Court decision has further clarified the position on what amounts to an “abuse of process” when it comes to determining the motive behind the presentation of a winding up petition by a creditor. The High Court has ruled that only where a petition is issued for a purpose other than to ensure the equitable winding-up of a debtor company can it be considered an “abuse of process”, and goes on to outline what may constitute such an abuse.

Most bankruptcy lawyers are familiar with section 1111(b) and its attempt to rectify a perceived unfairness resulting from the ruling in In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., Case No. B75-4345A, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17366 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 1976). In Pinegate, the creditor’s collateral had depreciated as the result of a cyclical market fluctuation.

Events are happening quickly these days with Caesars Entertainment.  On January 13, holders of second lien notes issued by Caesars Entertainment Operating Company (“CEOC”) filed an involuntary chapter 11 petition against CEOC in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.  Two days later, CEOC itself filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, setting up a venue fight over the bankruptcy case.  And later that same day, the U.S.

Sophisticated distressed investors know the benefits of acquiring assets through a § 363 sale in a bankruptcy case. The primary benefit, of course, is acquiring assets free and clear of pre-existing liens, claims and interests. There are some occasions, however, where it is not practical for a buyer to request that a sale be run through a bankruptcy process, especially when the value of the assets and/or a sharp decline in the assets’ value does not justify the time and expense associated with a chapter 11 filing.