In a split decision issued late last week, the Sixth Circuit overturned a Michigan district court’s disposition of a tort suit from North Carolina arising out of allegedly faulty breast implants. In noting that “a venue transfer is not alchemy,” the court also construed complex choice-of-law issues in light of the Bankruptcy Code.

Under section 365(f)(1), a debtor is permitted to assume and assign leases and executory contracts notwithstanding contractual limitations or “applicable law” that restricts such assignment. However, that broad general authorization begins with the limiting language, “except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) of this section….”

On July 23, in ASARCO LLC v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, et al. No. 13-1435 (10th Cir.), the Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that settlement requirements are different in the bankruptcy context.  Section 113 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.

The Sixth Circuit is one of only five federal appellate courts to institute a bankruptcy appellate panel under 28 U.S.C. § 158(b).  (The others are the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits.) As the bankruptcy appellate panel is unfamiliar to many non-bankruptcy attorneys, this post will review the Sixth Circuit’s bankruptcy appellate panel. 

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dealt a blow to secured creditors in its recent decision holding that a debtor may prohibit a lender from credit bidding on its collateral in connection with a sale of assets under a plan of reorganization. In the case of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-4266 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2010), the court, in a 2-1 decision, determined that a plan that provides secured lenders with the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured interest in an asset is not required to permit credit bidding when that asset is sold.

During the bankruptcy cycle following the recession of 2001, numerous debtors – notably airlines such as US Airways and United Air Lines, Inc. – undertook “distress terminations” of their ERISA-qualified defined benefit pension plans, which are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC found itself holding large general unsecured claims arising from significant underfunding of pension plans insured by the PBGC as a result of these terminations. Efforts by the PBGC to obtain either administrative priority or secured status for these claims invariably failed.1

Recently, lawyers for 50 Cent fought against the appointment of a bankruptcy examiner to investigate Instagram photos the rapper posted of himself lying next to piles of hundred dollar bills. In one picture, the bills spelled out the word “BROKE.” The humor of the photos was lost on the Office of the U.S. Trustee, who viewed the postings as disrespectful of the bankruptcy process and possible evidence that 50 Cent committed bankruptcy fraud by concealing assets from his creditors.

When is there sufficient evidence to hold that a fiduciary’s debt to an ERISA benefit plan is non-dischargeable in bankruptcy?  The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York recently held in In re Kern, Case No. 13-08096 (Dec.

On August 4, 2015, we posted: “Equitable Mootness In The Third Circuit: Dead Or Alive?”, which analyzed the Third Circuit’s opinion in In re One2One Communications.   The post predicted that Judge Krause’s concurrence would likely result in further opinions on equitable mootness.  Less than a month later we have such an opinion.  InAurelius v. Tribune, 14-3332 (3d Cir.

In a case that could have upended the bankruptcy and magistrate court systems, the Supreme Court took a pragmatic approach yesterday when it held in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif that with “knowing and voluntary consent” of the parties, a bankruptcy court could adjudicate a so-called “Sternclaim,” which would otherwise be outside the scope of its constitutional power.  The Court’s 2011 ruling in Stern v.