We have previously written about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court case considering the question of whether the 2018 difference in fees between Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts was consistent with the Constitution’s uniformity requirement for bankruptcy laws.
A discharge in bankruptcy usually discharges a debtor from the debtor’s liabilities. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, sets forth certain exceptions to this policy, including for “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
Our May 22 post reported on the Supreme Court’s May 20 decision in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v.
The Bottom Line
On August 27, 2007, United States District Judge Shira Scheindlin held that Springfield Associates, an innocent transferee of a claim from Citigroup against Enron, was not subject to certain counterclaims and defenses so long as Springfield was a “purchaser” and not an “assignee” of the claim. See In re Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs. L.L.C., No. 07 Civ. 1957, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63129 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007).
On July 13, 2010, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously held that auto-parts supplier Visteon Corporation could not terminate health and life insurance benefits for approximately 2,100 retirees during its chapter 11 bankruptcy unless Visteon followed the specific requirements laid out in section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, even if Visteon would have had the unilateral right to terminate these benefits outside bankruptcy.1 The Court found that a debtor may terminate any retiree benefits in bankruptcy only if,inter alia, the debt
In In re City of Vallejo,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California held recently that the City of Vallejo has the authority to reject its collective bargaining agreements with the city’s firefighters and electrical workers as part of its chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding without going through the process detailed in section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court determined that a municipality does not need to comply with the stringent requirements that corporations face when seeking to reject a collective bargaining agreement (a “CBA”).
In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Moran Towing Corp. (In re Bethlehem Steel Corp.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that preferential transfer claims were not arbitrable. The Court reasoned that because the avoidance powers did not belong to the debtor, but rather were creditor claims that could only be brought by a trustee or debtor-in-possession, they were not subject to the arbitration clauses in contracts to which the creditors were not parties.
The Dispute and the Arbitration Clauses
On June 16th, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision that is likely to have a significant impact on how debtors will sell assets in bankruptcy. InFlorida Department of Revenue v.
Introduction