Earlier this year, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that a nondebtor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, even if the parties had entered into pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff.1 In reaching its decision, the Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to “mutual” obligations — i.e., direct obligations between a single obligor and obligee.

Introduction

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has ruled that a creditor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, despite pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff. In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2009 WL 68873 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). The Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to mutual obligations between a debtor and a single nondebtor.

In Henderson v. Powermate Holding Corp. (In re Powermate Holding Corp.)1, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware became the second bankruptcy court to address the status of WARN Act claims after the 2005 amendments to section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In CDI Trust v. U.S. Electronics, Inc. (In re Communications Dynamics, Inc.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed the issue of whether a rejection damages claim is subject to setoff against a pre-petition debt owed by the creditor to the debtor. The Court found that a rejection damages claim should be treated as if it arose pre-petition, and that the provisions of section 553 permitted, rather than prevented, the setoff of the rejection damages claim against the pre-petition debt.

Background

On May 4, 2012 Judge Kevin J. Carey of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a claim against a debtor’s estate, transferred to a third party, is subject to the same infirmities as in the hands of the original holder of the claim.  In re KB Toys, Inc., — B.R. —-, 2012 WL 1570755, at *11 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).  Judge Carey’s opinion diverged from, and criticized, the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C., 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently dismissed equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer claims filed by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Champion Enterprises, Inc.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently dismissed equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer claims filed by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Champion Enterprises, Inc. ("Champion") against more than 100 prepetition lenders to Champion (collectively, the "Defendants")1.

When selling assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or pursuant to a plan, debtors typically conduct auctions, selecting the highest or best bidder as the purchaser. Section 363 auctions are intended to enable debtors to maximize the value of their assets, while ensuring "finality and integrity in the process . . . ."1

In recent years, constructively fraudulent transfer claims asserted in bankruptcy cases, especially those arising from LBOs and similar shareholder transactions, have hit a major road block.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently issued an opinion that addresses, among other issues, the question of whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts certain fraudulent transfer avoidance actions brought under state law. In re Physiotherapy Holdings Inc., No. 15-51238 (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2016).