Creditors have recently made some headway in collecting the full amount to which they are contractually entitled pursuant to various debt instruments. In In re Calpine Corp.,1 reported in our summer 2007 newsletter, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York permitted a secured creditor to collect damages (albeit in the form of an unsecured claim) caused by dashed expectations due to the early repayment of its debt.

In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “U.S. Court”) exercised its abstention powers and dismissed an involuntary chapter 11 petition filed against an Argentine company, Compania de Alimentos Fargo, SA (“Fargo”).1 Fargo, a debtor in an insolvency proceeding in Argentina, had moved to dismiss the involuntary petition principally because its Argentine bankruptcy case was still pending.

The next time you negotiate a settlement payment with a financially troubled party, you may want to keep in mind an ancient term related to livestock herding: earmarking. The concept may be somewhat antiquated, but the Second Circuit has recently confirmed that it is still viable – and can help you keep the settlement payment if the other party later files for bankruptcy.

Must a foreign debtor's insolvency representative obtain permission from a United States bankruptcy court before exercising the debtor's rights as shareholder to remove and replace directors and officers of a US corporation? The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Ninth Circuit recently held not, provided that the representative does not require judicial assistance to exercise these rights.1

In a recent adversary proceeding brought by a chapter 7 trustee to recharacterize a creditor’s claim from a debt claim to an equity interest, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina denied a creditor’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim where the trustee had alleged that the lender assumed control over the corporation after the date of the credit agreement.

Owners of bank loan participations take on two kinds of credit risk: (i) the borrower’s failure to pay the underlying bank loan, and (ii) the loan participation grantor’s bankruptcy. The first risk is well understood and carefully analyzed in each transaction. This memorandum focuses on the second kind of credit risk assumed by a participant -- grantor insolvency.

One of the hallmarks of chapter 11, and bankruptcy jurisprudence in general in the U.S., is the fundamental right of creditors and other stakeholders to have a meaningful voice in the proceedings concerning matters that affect their economic interests.

We have written in the past about the risks to investors in troubled companies from trustees in bankruptcy seeking recoveries for the estate on theories such as insider trading, breaches of duty and conflicts of interest. While those risks remain real, a recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should provide some restraint on bankruptcy trustees.

In Kendrick v. Deutsche National Trust Company (In re Saint Clair), 380 B.R. 478 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2008), the Chapter 7 Trustee appealed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky to the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”). The issue on appeal was whether summary judgment was warranted against the Appellee-Mortgagor (“Mortgagor”) on the Appellant- Trustee’s (“Trustee”) complaint seeking to avoid a mortgage on the Debtors’ real property. 

On April 9, 2008, the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued its opinion in Miller v. McDonald, et al., 2008 WL 1002035 (Bkrtcy.D.Del.), in which it held that the general counsel of a public company had a duty to implement a system that would provide reasonable monitoring to prevent corporate wrongdoing. The court found that the general counsel’s duty arose from two sources. First, Delaware law imposes a duty on directors and senior officers to implement a system that would provide reasonable monitoring of corporate activity.