On June 23, 2011, the US Supreme Court issued a narrowly-divided decision in Stern v. Marshall, limiting Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction over certain types of claims. The Court found that while the Bankruptcy Court was statutorily authorized to enter final judgment on a tortious interference counterclaim (as a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)), it was not constitutionally authorized to do so.
On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, that a Bankruptcy Judge lacked constitutional authority to issue a final ruling on state law counterclaims by a debtor against a claimant. This is the latest round of a well-known case involving the estate of former model Anna Nicole Smith and the estate of her late husband, wealthy oil magnate J. Howard Marshall.
Many of the cases we have reported on continue to be hotly debated among the parties and are subject to appeals or motions for reconsideration. In an effort to keep you updated, we have highlighted some of these developments below.
Musicland
A recent decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York underscores the risk to junior creditors of not understanding fully the scope of consent given to a senior creditor to modify its senior lending arrangements with a debtor under the terms of an intercreditor agreement. In Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. v.
A hedge fund sued an investment bank for tortious interference based on its exclusion from participation in exit financing for a debtor. The bankruptcy court granted the investment banker’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the hedge fund appealed.
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.
Root of the Constitutional Problem
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 28, 2013, that a secured lender’s full credit bid for a Chapter 11 debtor’s assets at a bankruptcy court sale barred any later recovery from the debtor’s guarantors. In re Spillman Development Group, Ltd., ___ F.3d ___, 2013WL 757648 (5th Cir. 2/28/13). A “credit bid” allows a creditor to “offset its [undisputed] claim against the purchase price,” a right explicitly granted by Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(k). 3 Collier, Bankruptcy, ¶ 363.06[10], at 363-59 (16th rev. ed. 2010).
On August 29, 2016, the Third Circuit released a precedential opinion (the “Opinion”) which opined on whether filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition could qualify as tortious interference under state law. The Third Circuit’s Opinion is available here. This Opinion was issued in Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, Case No. 15-2622. The District Court had ruled that the tortious interference claim was preempted by § 303(i) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On June 9, 2014, the US Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (“Executive Benefits”)1 that resolved a fundamental bankruptcy procedural issue that had arisen in the wake of Stern v.
The scenario has become all too familiar in recent years: a borrower defaults on a loan and, when the lender pursues the loan collateral through foreclosure or other proceedings, the borrower files for bankruptcy protection. More often than not, when the lender appears in bankruptcy court to pursue its interest in the collateral, the borrower counterattacks with a host of state law lender liability claims.