Sunrise, sunset. Perhaps a matchmaker would have helped. The saga of the dispute between Ventas, Inc. and Health Care Property Investors, Inc. arose five years ago when Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Investment Trust’s "board of trustees determined that a strategic sale process of its assets would be beneficial to its unitholders, thus effectively putting Sunrise ‘in play’ on the public markets" (per Blair J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal) in Ventas, Inc. v.

On August 29, 2016, the Third Circuit released a precedential opinion (the “Opinion”) which opined on whether filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition could qualify as tortious interference under state law. The Third Circuit’s Opinion is available here. This Opinion was issued in Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, Case No. 15-2622. The District Court had ruled that the tortious interference claim was preempted by § 303(i) of the Bankruptcy Code.

IN RE: REPOSITORY TECHNOLOGIES, INC

A recent 7th Circuit Court of Appeals decision shows the risks of dealing with an entity known to be insolvent and demonstrates that claimants, however deserving, can expect little sympathy from the courts. (Fusion Capital Fund II, LLC v. Richard Ham and Carla Aufdenkamp No. 09-3723 decided August 2, 2010)

The appointment of a receiver is one of the oldest equitable remedies. A receiver can receive, preserve, and manage property and funds, and even take charge of an operating business, as directed by the court. Appointing a receiver is a powerful remedy, not undertaken lightly by the courts.

The Supreme Court recently issued its opinion in Stern v. Marshall (Stern), Case No. 10-179, 2011 WL 2472792 (U.S. June 23, 2011), invalidating the relatively common assumption that so called “core” bankruptcy proceedings are all matters in which the bankruptcy courts are permitted to enter final judgment, and undoubtedly fostering heightened jurisdictional scrutiny in the future.

The US Supreme Court has ruled in Stern v. Marshall (June 23, 2011) that a bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to render final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s compulsory counterclaim against a creditor arising under common law, despite a statutory grant of jurisdiction.

In a decision that may create serious problems for bankruptcy case administration, the Supreme Court this morning invalidated part of the Bankruptcy Court jurisdictional scheme. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179, 564 U.S. ___ (June 23, 2011). Specifically, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Courts cannot issue final judgments on garden variety state law claims that are asserted as counterclaims by the debtor or trustee against creditors who have filed proofs of claim in the bankruptcy case.

On June 22, 2011, the Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179, holding that the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) to enter judgment on a counterclaim that the bankruptcy estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall (a/k/a Anna Nicole Smith) asserted against E.

Introduction

On June 23, 2011, after fifteen years of hugely acrimonious litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States (the “Court”) issued a decision on a narrow legal issue that may end up significantly limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.