In Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil Co.),1 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a trustee could avoid a debtor's post-petition transfers of funds that were cash collateral, notwithstanding that the payments had been made in good faith and in the ordinary course of business.
Last week, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey,2 establishing an important precedent concerning the ability of bankruptcy courts to release claims against third party non-debtors in chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In the June 2009 issue of Cadwalader’s Restructuring Review newsletter, we introduced this case and considered the potential implications of a ruling on this important but unsettled topic.
In Aalfs v. Wirum (In re Straightline Investments, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a post-petition factoring of accounts receivable by the debtor was an avoidable transfer under section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court, finding that the post-petition transfer had been properly avoided and that the lower court was justified in allowing the trustee both to recover the accounts receivable and their proceeds and to retain the consideration paid by the transferee.
While the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision in section 546(e) previously provided comfort for brokerdealers, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), chips away at this provision and creates new risks for those providing brokerage account services. Always at risk as a deep pocket, new duties have been thrust upon brokerdealers that go far beyond the terms of the account agreement.
Factual Background
On May 25, 2012, Judge Allan L. Gropper of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved a motion to compel the production of certain documents under section 1521 of the Bankruptcy Code. In his decision, Judge Gropper also suggested that the broad discovery provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 2004 may apply to chapter 15 discovery requests, but stopped short of making such a ruling. In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Limited, Case No. 11-13171 (ALG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y May 25, 2012).
In a recent decision in the chapter 11 case of WestPoint Stevens, Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code to render an appeal of sale under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code statutorily moot. The Second Circuit held that because the Bankruptcy Court had not stayed the order authorizing the sale, a stay of only one aspect of the sale rendered moot of the sale in its entirety.
In In re City of Vallejo,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California held recently that the City of Vallejo has the authority to reject its collective bargaining agreements with the city’s firefighters and electrical workers as part of its chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding without going through the process detailed in section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court determined that a municipality does not need to comply with the stringent requirements that corporations face when seeking to reject a collective bargaining agreement (a “CBA”).
In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Moran Towing Corp. (In re Bethlehem Steel Corp.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that preferential transfer claims were not arbitrable. The Court reasoned that because the avoidance powers did not belong to the debtor, but rather were creditor claims that could only be brought by a trustee or debtor-in-possession, they were not subject to the arbitration clauses in contracts to which the creditors were not parties.
The Dispute and the Arbitration Clauses
The ability to discharge debts (i.e., liability on a claim) is essential to the fundamental goal of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code – providing debtors with a fresh start by resolving all claims that arose before confirmation of the debtor’s plan of reorganization. In determining the universe of debts eligible for discharge, Third Circuit courts labored for many years underAvellino v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir.
Two decades ago, the Supreme Court tackled the issue of whether a third party had submitted itself to jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,1 the Supreme Court ruled that a party who has not filed a claim against a bankrupt's estate is not subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. A year later, in Langenkamp v.