In Simon v. FIA Card Services, N.A.,[1] the U.S.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently ruled that a perpetual, royalty-free, and exclusive trademark licensing agreement qualified as an executory contract subject to assumption or rejection under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Eighth Circuit’s ruling is seemingly at odds with a 2010 decision by the Third Circuit which found an extremely similar licensing agreement to be non-executory.  These decisions may signal a circuit split on the issue, and in any event, create uncertainty for licensees who have acquired perpetual licenses in connection

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reiterated its position that the doctrine of equitable mootness should only apply if granting relief on appeal would undermine a consummated bankruptcy plan. In In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, the Third Circuit held that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania abused its discretion when summarily finding that the appeal at issue was equitably moot simply because the appellants failed to seek a stay and the debtors’ plan had been substantially consummated.

On May 1, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re Federal–Mogul Global, Inc. confirmed that anti-assignment provisions in a debtor’s insurance liability policies are preempted by the Bankruptcy Code to the extent they prohibit the transfer of a debtor’s rights under such policies to a personal-injury trust pursuant to a chapter 11 plan.In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 1511773 (3d Cir. 2012).

The ability to discharge debts (i.e., liability on a claim) is essential to the fundamental goal of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code – providing debtors with a fresh start by resolving all claims that arose before confirmation of the debtor’s plan of reorganization.  In determining the universe of debts eligible for discharge, Third Circuit courts labored for many years underAvellino v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir.

On May 14, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey that the fair market value of a creditor’s collateral as of the plan’s confirmation date is the proper method of valuing a secured creditor’s claim pursuant to section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Third Circuit also adopted a “burden-shifting framework,” finding that a secured creditor will bear the ultimate burden of proving the extent to which its claims are secured pursuant to section 506(a).

Background

On March 26, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to rule that, as a matter of law, payments made to satisfy a debtor’s obligations under a letter of credit constitute “settlement payments” protected from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. EPLG I, LLC v. Citibank, National Association et al. (In re Qimonda Richmond, LLC, et al.), No. 09-10589, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1264 (Bankr.

On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.

In the W.R. Grace bankruptcy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its prior rulings on the controversial issue of a bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin actions by third parties against non-debtors.1 Resting on prior precedent, the Third Circuit held that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin third party actions that have no direct effect upon the bankruptcy estate.

On July 13, 2010, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously held that auto-parts supplier Visteon Corporation could not terminate health and life insurance benefits for approximately 2,100 retirees during its chapter 11 bankruptcy unless Visteon followed the specific requirements laid out in section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, even if Visteon would have had the unilateral right to terminate these benefits outside bankruptcy.1 The Court found that a debtor may terminate any retiree benefits in bankruptcy only if,inter alia, the debt