In a prior post, we discussed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jevic Holding Corp., where the court upheld the use of so-called “structured dismissals” in bankruptcy cases, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jevic. The Court’s ultimate ruling will likely have a significant impact upon bankruptcy practice.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge Thomas Ambro, has reversed two district court opinions and refused to allow a company to use a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing as a means to reduce interest on its debt obligations. Specifically, the court held that filing for bankruptcy would not excuse a debtor from its obligation for a “make-whole” payment otherwise due to its lenders.

Because we couldn’t possibly top Judge Fisher’s opening line, we’re borrowing it for our introduction of In re Daniel W.

The extent of a transferee’s knowledge in the context of fraudulent transfer claims under the Bankruptcy Code has been a frequent topic of discussion on the Weil Bankruptcy Blog.

Earlier this week, the Third Circuit affirmed a federal bankruptcy court’s dismissal of a mesothelioma claim against a bankrupt oil company that arose as an adversary proceeding fifteen years after the bankruptcy plan was confirmed and discharged all outstanding claims.  The Circuit held that because the parties conceded the claim arose at the time of the victim’s asbestos exposure, which pre-dated the defendant’s bankruptcy, a

In post-confirmation proceedings, bankruptcy courts maintain the ability to clarify a plan where silent or ambiguous, and interpret a plan to advance equitable considerations.  However, bankruptcy courts are not allowed to modify a plan outside the confines of section

In 1984, the Third Circuit was the first court of appeals to examine the Bankruptcy Code’s new definition of “claim” in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). Focusing on the “right to payment” language in that definition, the court decided that a claim arises when a claimant’s right to payment accrues under applicable nonbankruptcy law. This “accrual” test was widely criticized by other circuit courts as contradicting the broad definition of “claim” envisioned by Congress and the Bankruptcy Code.

Affirming the bankruptcy and district courts below, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2012), held that a debtor could assign insurance policies to an asbestos trust established under section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding anti-assignment provisions in the policies and applicable state law.

Asbestos Trusts in Bankruptcy

Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates bifurcation of a debtor's obligation to a secured creditor into secured and unsecured claims, depending on the value of the collateral securing the debt. The term "value," however, is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and bankruptcy courts vary in their approaches to the meaning of the term. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held, among other things, that the “deepening insolvency” cause of action, which the Third Circuit previously recognized in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001), remains an independent cause of action under Pennsylvania law.

Background