I don't usually post about bankruptcy or criminal law issues, but the facts from a recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which involved both bankruptcy and criminal law issues, were too intriguing to ignore.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed that a foreclosure action commenced more than six years after the loan was accelerated could still be within the applicable statute of limitations. SeeIn re: Gordon Allen Washington; Gordon Allen Washington v. Bank of New York Mellon, As Tr. for the Certificate-Holders of the CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-5, 2016 WL 5827439 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2016). In the case, the borrowed executed a mortgage and promissory note in February 2007.
On August 29, 2016, the Third Circuit released a precedential opinion (the “Opinion”) which opined on whether filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition could qualify as tortious interference under state law. The Third Circuit’s Opinion is available here. This Opinion was issued in Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, Case No. 15-2622. The District Court had ruled that the tortious interference claim was preempted by § 303(i) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On August 23, 2016, Judge Sue L. Robinson of the Delaware District Court issued an Order denying an appellant’s motion for stay pending appeal. The decision was issued in a appeals arising from the Molycorp Bankruptcy (which is docketed, at case 15-11357 in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court). The appeals are docketed in the District Court as Case Numbers 16-286 and 16-288. A copy of the Opinion is available here.
The Third Circuit recently affirmed that a debtor in Chapter 11 can use a tender offer to settle claims without running afoul of the Bankruptcy Code. Although In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.is limited to its particular facts and circumstances, the decision could lead to increased use of tender offers prior to confirmation of a bankruptcy plan.
On August 3, 2016, Delaware Trust Company, as trustee for the EFIH first lien notes, filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, asking the Court to review the Energy Future Holding debtors’ settlement with the EFIH first lien noteholders.
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently faced a question of first impression: whether an allowed postpetition administrative expense claim can be used to set off preference liability. In concluding that it can, the court took a closer look at the nature of a preference claim.
Facts and Arguments
On August 9, 2016, Judge Kevin Carey of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued an Order both dismissing a complaint and striking a defendant’s Notice of Supplemental Authority. The decision was issued in the Quantum Foods bankruptcy, in the adversary proceeding No. 16-50045. A copy of the Opinion is available here.
In a pair of decisions in 2015, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of Delaware determined that neither the first lien notes trustee nor the second lien notes trustee of Energy Future Intermediate Holdings Corp. (“EFIH”), a subsidiary of Energy Future Holdings (“EFH”), was entitled to receive a make-whole on the repayment of the corresponding indebtedness resulting from the acceleration of that debt in the EFH bankruptcy case.
In the November/December 2014 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we discussed a decision handed down by the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware addressing the meaning of “unreasonably small capital” in the context of constructively fraudulent transfer avoidance litigation. In Whyte ex rel. SemGroup Litig. Trust v.