The Bankruptcy Protector

On June 6, 2022, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (U.S. June 6, 2022) that the increase in fees payable to the U.S. Trustee system in 2018 violated the uniformity aspect of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution because it was not immediately applicable in the two states with Bankruptcy Administrators rather than U.S. Trustees.

Owners of small business entities are frequently required to guaranty the debts of such entities.  Those business entities might later file for Chapter 11, and may be able to achieve confirmation of a plan to restructure their indebtedness.   The question then presented is whether this confirmation event affects the separate guaranty obligations of the owners?  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently explored this issue in In re: Larry

On July 23, in ASARCO LLC v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, et al. No. 13-1435 (10th Cir.), the Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that settlement requirements are different in the bankruptcy context.  Section 113 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.

Can a nondischargeability suit survive after a claim is deemed “satisfied in full” under a confirmed plan?  The Tenth Circuit recently considered this question in Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit―in Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2013)―has joined the Second Circuit and departed from the Fifth Circuit by holding that an allegedly fraudulently transferred asset is not property of the estate until recovered pursuant to section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore is not covered by the automatic stay. According to the court, its decision “gives Congress’s chosen language its ordinary meaning, and abides by a rule against surplusage.”

2012 is shaping up as a year of bankruptcy first impressions for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals sailed into uncharted bankruptcy waters twice already this year in the same chapter 11 case. On January 24, the court ruled in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 2012 WL 178998 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) ("Thorpe I"), that an appeal by certain nonsettling asbestos insurers of an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not equitably moot because, among other things, the plan had not been "substantially consummated" under the court's novel construction of that statutory term.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

The solicitation of creditor votes on a plan is a crucial part of the chapter 11 process. At a minimum, a chapter 11 plan can be confirmed only if at least one class of impaired creditors (or interest holders) votes to accept the plan. A plan proponent’s efforts to solicit an adequate number of plan acceptances, however, may be complicated if creditors or other enfranchised stakeholders neglect (or choose not) to vote.

The ability to borrow money during the course of a bankruptcy case is an important tool available to a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”). Often times, the debtor’s most logical choice for a lender is one with an existing pre-bankruptcy relationship with the debtor. As a condition to making new loans, however, lenders commonly require the debtor to waive its right to pursue avoidance or lender liability actions against the lender based upon pre-bankruptcy events.

As the Supreme Court recently reminded us in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, not all orders in bankruptcy cases are immediately appealable as a matter of right. Only those orders deemed sufficiently “final” may be appealed without leave under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).