Background

On October 3, 2011, the California Supreme Court heard argument in Francis Harris et al v. Superior Court, Case No. S156555. The issue here is whether insurance adjusters should be eligible for overtime pay under California’s wage and hour laws.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled that the Massachusetts Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, Chapter 183C of the General Laws of Massachusetts, is preempted by the high cost home loan provisions of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) for federally chartered depository institutions. The July 27 ruling came in a case brought by Massachusetts residents who had jointly received a home mortgage loan from a national bank.

On August 22nd, the Federal Reserve Board proposed a two-year phase-in period for most savings and loan holding companies ("SLHCs") to file Federal Reserve regulatory reports with the Board and an exemption for some SLHCs from initially filing Federal Reserve regulatory reports. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, supervisory and rulemaking authority for SLHCs and their non-depository subsidiaries was transferred from the OTS to the Board. The Board previously sought comment on whether to require SLHCs to submit the same reports as bank holding companies.

Several states have recently added provisions to their insurance rehabilitation and liquidation acts which address the rights of parties to certain derivatives transactions with an insurance company in the event that an order of rehabilitation or liquidation is entered against the insurer. In short, these laws allow parties to exercise certain early termination and close-out netting provisions without regard to the applicable stay mechanism under state insurance insolvency law.

Desperate times call for desperate measures.  It is not surprising then that a less than scrupulous debtor might be less than candid when disclosing assets and liabilities to a bankruptcy court.  But what happens if an individual debtor is discovered to have concealed assets – possibly fraudulently or in bad faith – and then seeks to exercise his or her statutory right under the Bankruptcy Code to exempt all or a portion of the discovered assets from being available to satisfy creditors?  Can a bankruptcy court in that circumstance look to the bad acts of the debtor as a basi

On April 18, 2007, in Fla. Dep’t. of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the stamp tax exemption of 11 USC § 1146(c)2 may apply to transfers of assets that were necessary to the consummation of a bankruptcy plan of reorganization and were made prior to confirmation of the plan. In reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit declined to follow decisions of the Third and Fourth Circuits to the contrary and thus created a split among the circuits on this issue.

The ability to sell assets during the course of a chapter 11 case without incurring transfer taxes customarily levied on such transactions outside of bankruptcy often figures prominently in a potential debtor’s strategic bankruptcy planning. However, the circumstances under which a sale and related transactions (e.g., recording of mortgages) qualify for the tax exemption have been a focal point of dispute for many courts, including no less than four circuit courts of appeal.

On March 26, 2008, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of State of Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. to consider the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's ruling that a bankruptcy court may exempt certain state and local taxes in a sale approved prior to confirmation of a chapter 11 plan under § 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Introduction

Section 1146(a) (formerly, and for the purposes of this case § 1146(c)) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

On June 16, 2008, Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the court in Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and held that § 1146(a) provides an exemption to state stamp taxes only where a sale occurs pursuant to a plan that has been confirmed, and did not properly apply to a case where the plan was confirmed several months after the bankruptcy court approved the sale.