In a recently filed motion in the United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York (the “Motion”), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) is seeking to compel Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to perform its obligations under a swap agreement between Metavante and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.
In Hutson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has ruled that a creditor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, despite pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff. In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2009 WL 68873 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). The Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to mutual obligations between a debtor and a single nondebtor.
September 21, 2008 Following a week of unprecedented market upheaval, players in financial contracts got some reassurance from the bankruptcy judge presiding over the liquidation of broker/dealer Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”) and the sale of a portion of its assets to Barclays Capital Inc. (“BCI”).
In the current economic climate, there are a number of key issues facing borrowers in the event of lender insolvency or default.
Committed facilities/term loans
Provided they are fully drawn and the borrower is not in breach itself, the impact in the short term may not be too severe.
On Jan. 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a trust deed provision reversing a priority of payment waterfall upon the bankruptcy of a credit support provider under a swap agreement is unenforceable under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order on Sept. 17, 2009, granting a motion filed by Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) to compel Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to continue to make payments to LBSF under an ISDA Master Agreement.
As a result of the recent turmoil in the financial markets, a number of clients have asked us questions about counterparty risk. The following is a summary of some of the key issues in dealing with financial counterparties. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”) and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (“SIPA”) each seek to protect “customer property” in the event of the failure, insolvency or liquidation of a broker-dealer.1 Neither affords customers the certainty of a 100% recovery, however.
Funds' assets in the U.S. has been denied by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. See 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2949, *26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30 , 2007). The Funds were being liquidated in the Cayman Islands, but the bankruptcy court held that they were not eligible for Chapter 15 relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") because the liquidations were not pending in a country where the Funds had their "center of main interests" or an "establishment" for the conduct of business.
TheLehman Brothers bankruptcy court has determined that the contractually specified methodology for conducting the liquidation of a swap agreement is protected by the safe harbor provisions of the bankruptcy, even if the selected methodology would be more favorable to the non-defaulting counterparty than the liquidation methodology that would apply absent the bankruptcy.See Michigan State Housing Dev. Auth. v. Lehman Bros. Deriv. Prods. Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), No. 08-13555, ---B.R.