In a major victory for secured creditors, the United States Supreme Court, on May 29, 2012, unanimously held that a chapter 11 plan involving a sale of secured property must afford the secured creditor the right to credit bid for the property under section 363(k) of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).¹ In so holding, the Supreme Court resolved the split that had emerged among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, as illustrated by the Seventh Circuit’s decision below,² which contrasted with recent decisions from the Third and Fifth Circui

The United States Supreme Court accepted the petition for certiorari on the Seventh Circuit decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank on December 12, 2011 and arguments will likely be heard by the Court in April 2012. This case presents the Supreme Court with the important issue of whether secured lenders are entitled to submit a credit bid, a bid not requiring actual transfer of payment, at the sale of their collateral in the Bankruptcy Court.

In June 2011, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case known as Stern v. Marshall. The U.S. Supreme Court held that filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case does not constitute consent to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over all counterclaims or actions that the bankruptcy estate may later bring against the creditor.

In fact, filing the proof of claim constitutes consent only to those claims or actions that either (1) stem from the bankruptcy case itself; or (2) are necessary to the resolution of the creditor’s proof of claim.  

Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to find that a chapter 11 “cramdown” plan is “fair and equitable” to an objecting class of secured creditors if the plan provides for the realization by such holders of the “indubitable equivalent” of their claims. Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), through reference to Section 363(k), permits the sale of collateral free and clear of liens if secured creditors are allowed to “credit bid”—that is, to bid the value of their claim in an auction of the collateral.

Whittle Development, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.

In the recent case of Whittle Development, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Whittle Development, Inc.), No. 10-37084, 2011 WL 3268398 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2011), a bankruptcy court was asked whether a preference action could be sustained against a creditor who purchased real property in a properly conducted state law foreclosure sale. Recognizing a split of authority and some contrary principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in its prior decision, BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994), the bankruptcy court found that a preference claim could be asserted.

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States issued the decision of Stern v. Marshall, debatably the most important case on bankruptcy court jurisdiction in the last 30 years. The 5-4 decision, written by Chief Justice Roberts, established limits on the power of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments on certain state law created causes of action.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled that the Massachusetts Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, Chapter 183C of the General Laws of Massachusetts, is preempted by the high cost home loan provisions of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) for federally chartered depository institutions. The July 27 ruling came in a case brought by Massachusetts residents who had jointly received a home mortgage loan from a national bank.

A secured creditor's option to credit bid its claim where its collateral is to be sold under a chapter 11 plan is an important protection to ensure that the creditor's collateral is not sold for less than its actual value. Rather than accepting the cash generated by a low bid, the creditor can submit its own bid, up to the amount of its secured claim, and recover its collateral instead. This traditionally recognized right was upset by two fairly recent circuit court decisions, one from the Fifth Circuit and one from the Third Circuit. In re Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

On September 13, 2011, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware granted standing for an equity committee in In re Washington Mutual, Inc. (“WaMu”) to seek “equitable disallowance” of claims held by noteholders that had traded claims after engaging in negotiations with WaMu over the terms of a global restructuring.