The Bankruptcy Code allows bankruptcy trustees, debtors in possession, and official committees to hire attorneys, accountants, and other professionals to assist them in carrying out their statutory duties, with their fees to be paid by the bankruptcy estate. However, to get paid, these professionals must obtain approval from the bankruptcy court. But what happens when someone objects to their fees? Can the professionals recover the fees they incur in defending their fee applications? The Supreme Court says no.
On June 15, 2015, the US Supreme Court ruled that a law firm could not recover fees it incurred in defending its own fee application.
THE ASARCO CASE
The case involved the copper company ASARCO LLC that filed for Chapter 11 protection in 2005 to deal with cash flow and environmental issues, among others.
On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court decided Bank of America v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, together with Bank of America v. Toledo-Cardona, No. 14-163, holding unanimously that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtor cannot “strip off” a junior lien.
The US Supreme Court has unanimously held that a debtor cannot void a wholly underwater second mortgage in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The decision comes in the consolidated cases of Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, and Bank of America, N.A. v. Toledo-Cardona, No. 14-163.
The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, Case No. 14-115, that a bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of a debtor’s proposed plan is not a “final” order that can be immediately appealed. The Supreme Court’s decision implicates practical considerations within the bankruptcy process and the appropriate balance between the bargaining power of debtors and creditors.
Case Summary
The Supreme Court recently confirmed in Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif that parties may consent to having bankruptcy judges resolve their non-core claims – claims to which bankruptcy courts would normally lack adjudicatory authority. The issue presented to the court was whether Article III permits the exercise of the judicial power of the United States by the bankruptcy courts on the basis of litigant consent, and if so, whether implied consent based on a litigant’s conduct is sufficient to satisfy Article III.
On May 4, 2015, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, Case No. 14-115, that a bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of a debtor’s proposed plan is not a “final” order that can be immediately appealed. The Supreme Court’s decision implicates practical considerations within the bankruptcy process and the appropriate balance between the bargaining power of debtors and creditors
Case Summary
On May 4, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, No. 14-116, a case which deals with issues of finality and appealability of orders in bankruptcy proceedings. In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that a bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of a Chapter 13 debtor’s proposed repayment plan is not a final order and thus is not immediately appealable.
BACKGROUND
On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court for the United States unanimously held that an order denying confirmation of a plan is not a “final” order subject to immediate appeal as a matter of right.1 Although the Bullard decision involved a plan proposed under chapter 13 to title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (the “Bankruptcy Code”), the holding is equally applicable to bankruptcy cases filed under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.