In an appeal involving a Chapter 12 bankruptcy, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed that the borrower’s use of the 20-year treasury bond rate sufficiently ensured that the total present value of future payments to the lender over the plan period equaled or exceeded the allowed value of the claim.
A copy of the opinion in Farm Credit Services of America v. William Topp is available at: Link to Opinion.
Although a non-insolvency case the recent case of PACCAR Inc & Ors v Competition Appeal Tribunal & Ors (“PACCAR”) has caused waves in the litigation market (including insolvency litigation market) following the Supreme Court finding that litigation funding agreements (LFAs) where funders recover a percentage of the amount awarded to a claimant are damaged based agreements (DBAs) – which- unless the LFA complied with the Damages Based Agreements Regulations 2013 (“DBA Regs”) means that they are unenforceable.
In a mass-tort bankruptcy, when 95% of 120,000 creditors vote to accept a mediated plan paying over $7 billion to creditors, shouldn’t the plan be confirmed?
In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions to creditors in a "structured dismissal" of a chapter 11 case that violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules without the consent of creditors. However, because the Court declined to express any "view about the legality of structured dismissals in general," many open questions remain regarding the structured dismissal mechanism.
The finality of asset sales and other transactions in bankruptcy is an indispensable feature of U.S. bankruptcy law designed to maximize the value of a bankruptcy estate as expeditiously as possible for the benefit of all stakeholders. To promote such finality, section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits reversal or modification on appeal of an order authorizing a sale or lease to a "good-faith" purchaser or lessee unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending appeal. What constitutes "good faith" has sometimes been disputed by the courts.
The finality of asset sales and other transactions in bankruptcy is an indispensable feature of U.S. bankruptcy law designed to maximize the value of a bankruptcy estate as expeditiously as possible for the benefit of all stakeholders. To promote such finality, section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits reversal or modification on appeal of an order authorizing a sale or lease to a "good-faith" purchaser or lessee unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending appeal. What constitutes "good faith" has sometimes been disputed by the courts.
There is longstanding controversy concerning the validity of third-party release provisions in non-asbestos trust chapter 11 plans that limit the potential exposure of various non-debtor parties involved in the process of negotiating, implementing and funding a plan. In the latest chapter of this debate, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down a long-awaited ruling regarding the validity of nonconsensual third-party releases in the chapter 11 plan of pharmaceutical company Purdue Pharma, Inc. and its affiliated debtors (collectively, "Purdue").
In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions to creditors in a "structured dismissal" of a chapter 11 case that violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules without the consent of creditors. However, because the Court declined to express any "view about the legality of structured dismissals in general," many open questions remain regarding the structured dismissal mechanism.
A bankruptcy trustee's ability to avoid and recover pre-bankruptcy preferential transfers is essential to preserving or augmenting the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. In 2019, however, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to add a due diligence requirement to the Bankruptcy Code's preference avoidance provision, apparently as a way to minimize the volume of speculative and coercive preference litigation.
To prevent "trafficking in corporate shells," the Bankruptcy Code prohibits any discharge of corporate or partnership debts if the debtor is not an "individual" and, in a chapter 11 case, if the debtor proposes a liquidating chapter 11 plan contemplating the cessation of the debtor's business following confirmation.