In Short

The Situation: In In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., secured noteholders argued that replacement notes distributed to them under a cram-down chapter 11 plan should bear market-rate interest rather than the lower formula rate proposed in the plan and that they were entitled to a make-whole premium.

The United States Second Circuit has issued its ruling in the Momentive Performance Materials casesresolving three separate appeals by different groups of creditors of Judge Bricetti’s judgment in the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York, which affirmed

Unsecured creditors and other stakeholders sometimes challenge the reasonableness of fees incurred by estate professionals in a bankruptcy case. Whether this is to augment unsecured creditor recoveries or serve as a check on the private bar is in the eye of the beholder. Whatever the reason, fee litigation in bankruptcy caused many professionals to seek payment from the bankruptcy estate for any fees incurred defending against an objection to their fees.

The Supreme Court two years ago ruled in Baker Botts v. Asarco that bankruptcy professionals entitled to compensation from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate had no statutory right to be compensated for time spent defending against objections to their fee applications.

One overarching certainty of federal debt collection law seems to be prolonged uncertainty over its appropriate scope. Is this scope about to change yet again? One recent bill called the Practice of Law Technical Clarification Act of 2017, H.R. 1849, seeks to do just that.

In one of the most important bankruptcy court decisions of all time, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the United States Supreme Court held that the 1979 Bankruptcy Code was unconstitutional because it lodged too much judicial power in bankruptcy judges who were not given “Article III” status, which grants lifetime tenure and salary protection and helps assure judicial independence.

On August 10, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court rescinded the grant of certiorari in PEM Entities LLC v. Levin on the grounds that review had been “improvidently granted.” The case seemingly provided a perfect vehicle to resolve the circuit split on whether federal or state law governs debt recharacterization in bankruptcy, and less than two months after the Court first agreed to hear the case, its dismissal came as a surprise.

Two years have passed since the United States Supreme Court passed down a 5-4 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges which held that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Editors’ Note: The Supreme Court’s Jevic ruling last spring remains a treasure trove of bankruptcy theory, suitable for the novice bankruptcy student and highly instructional for those of us who have practiced in chapter 11 for years. We at The Bankruptcy Cave like it so much that we will be offering a few more posts in upcoming weeks on the lower courts’ interpretation of Jevic since the spring, the continued efforts in Delaware to sidestep Jevic, and other important learning from the case.

Late last week, the United States Supreme Court said that it erred when it granted certiorari to resolve a bankruptcy dispute over whether state or federal law should apply to the recharacterization of debt. In In re Province Grande Olde Liberty, LLC, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court and district court, both of which had relied on the Bankruptcy Code to recharacterize a debt from a secured claim to a capital investment. The high Court took the matter up in June presumably to address the current circuit split on the issue.