In one of the most important bankruptcy court decisions of all time, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the United States Supreme Court held that the 1979 Bankruptcy Code was unconstitutional because it lodged too much judicial power in bankruptcy judges who were not given “Article III” status, which grants lifetime tenure and salary protection and helps assure judicial independence.
On August 10, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court rescinded the grant of certiorari in PEM Entities LLC v. Levin on the grounds that review had been “improvidently granted.” The case seemingly provided a perfect vehicle to resolve the circuit split on whether federal or state law governs debt recharacterization in bankruptcy, and less than two months after the Court first agreed to hear the case, its dismissal came as a surprise.
Two years have passed since the United States Supreme Court passed down a 5-4 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges which held that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Editors’ Note: The Supreme Court’s Jevic ruling last spring remains a treasure trove of bankruptcy theory, suitable for the novice bankruptcy student and highly instructional for those of us who have practiced in chapter 11 for years. We at The Bankruptcy Cave like it so much that we will be offering a few more posts in upcoming weeks on the lower courts’ interpretation of Jevic since the spring, the continued efforts in Delaware to sidestep Jevic, and other important learning from the case.
Late last week, the United States Supreme Court said that it erred when it granted certiorari to resolve a bankruptcy dispute over whether state or federal law should apply to the recharacterization of debt. In In re Province Grande Olde Liberty, LLC, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court and district court, both of which had relied on the Bankruptcy Code to recharacterize a debt from a secured claim to a capital investment. The high Court took the matter up in June presumably to address the current circuit split on the issue.
This two-part article discusses the key concerns, from a non-consolidation and true sale perspective, that arise when an insurance company, as opposed to a bankruptcy-eligible entity, is a sponsor/seller in a securitization or similar structured finance transaction. This Part One introduces the main contrasts between non-con and true sale analysis in a traditional bankruptcy context and such analysis in an insurance-law scenario.
On June 27, 2017, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari regarding the decision In re Province Grande Olde Liberty, LLC, 655 Fed.Appx. 971 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 2016) to decide a circuit split on the applicable standard for debt recharacterization.
Late last month, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari review of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in PEM Entities LLC v. Eric M. Levin & Howard Shareff. At issue in PEM Entities is whether a debt claim held by existing equity investors should be recharacterized as equity. The Supreme Court is now poised to resolve a split among the federal circuits concerning whether federal or state law should govern debt recharacterization claims.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in PEM Entities LLC v. Levin, in which it will decide whether federal or a state law should apply when a debt claim held by a debtor’s insider is sought to be recharacterized in bankruptcy as a capital contribution and treated as equity. The case raises important questions about the extent to which the commencement of a proceeding under the U.S.
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