Background

The United Kingdom Supreme Court recently decided the appeal in the important case In the Matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2012] UK (the Case).

In summary, the Case is about which claims can be treated as claims for client money. This turns on interpreting the rules of the UK’s Financial Services Authority’s (FSA) Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS) in chapter 7 of CASS. These FSA rules stem from the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).

The Supreme Court yesterday ruled that client money held in un-segregated accounts should be treated the same as client money held in segregated accounts, enabling un-segregated account holders to share in the client money pool on the insolvency of a firm with whom the account is held.

The Court of Appeal decision in the Nortel case upheld the High Court ruling that FSD/CN liability is an expense of the administration and therefore ranks ahead of administrators' remuneration, floating charges and unsecured creditors. Much of the press coverage which has followed in the immediate aftermath seems to have assumed that the decision is a victory for "good" pensioners over the "bad" banks.

The Supreme Court’s decision in a dispute over a parent company guarantee will change the way insolvency practitioners deal with the distribution of assets when a corporate group collapses.

The Supreme Court recently considered the scope of the anti-deprivation principle, in Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited (respondent) v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (appellant) [2011] UKSC 38 (Belmont). Understanding the scope of this principle is important for anyone entering a contract where the parties’ rights and obligations change if one of them enters an insolvency procedure. Robert Spedding explains how the courts applied the principle in Belmont and makes some practical suggestions for avoiding problems.

In Rainy Sky S.A and six others v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court provided useful guidance on the role of business common sense in construing a clause in a commercial contract, particularly in circumstances where there are competing plausible constructions, neither of which is clearly preferable on the language used alone.

The facts

One of the many issues which arose from the collapse of Lehman Brothers was whether “flip provisions”, which reverse a swap counterparty’s priority in the order of payment on insolvency, were invalid on the basis that they contravened the anti-deprivation principle.  This is a long-established common law principle which seeks to prevent an insolvent party from arranging its affairs to frustrate the legitimate claims of creditors.

In its recent decision in Belmont Park Investments PTY Ltd v BNY Corporate trustee Services Ltd and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc,[1] the Supreme Court ruled in favour of investors, clarifying the limits of the anti-deprivation rule and holding that a commercially sensible transaction entered into in good faith and without the intention to evade insolvency laws should not infringe the anti-deprivation rule.

Background

Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and another [2011] UKSC 38.

The Supreme Court has clarified the extent to which it is possible for a contract to provide for a company or individual to lose assets on insolvency.  

Summary

Well-established rules are unchanged, so landlords can still forfeit leases on insolvency. In other cases, if a transaction is entered into in good faith and for valid commercial reasons, it is likely to be upheld.

In New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd & Anr v AE Grant & Ors, the Court of Appeal has upheld a first instance decision that section 426 of the Insolvency Act (IA) can be used to enforce a foreign monetary judgment in insolvency proceedings. However, the Court acknowledged that where there exists a statutory framework for the enforcement of foreign judgments, in this case enforcement pursuant to the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (the 1933 Act), then enforcement under s.426 of the IA must follow the requirements of the 1933 Act.