In the most significant decision of the decade on a matter of U.S. bankruptcy law, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its highly anticipated decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. ____ (2024) on June 27, 2024, striking down the non-consensual third party releases that were the cornerstone of Purdue Pharma's Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization by a vote of 5-4. In doing so, the Court said:
On June 27, 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, addressing the question of whether a company can use bankruptcy to resolve the liability of non-debtor third parties. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and an injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge the claims against a nondebtor without the consent of the affected claimants.
Last week, in a 5-to-4 decision in the case ofHarrington, United States Trustee, Region 2 v. Purdue Pharma L.P, et al., the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the ability of bankruptcy courts to order non-consensual third-party releases (i.e., claims held by non-debtors against non-debtor third parties) as part of a Chapter 11 plan.
The phrase “Texas Two-Step,” as used in bankruptcy, is a legal expletive. Regardless of what the details of a Texas Two-Step might be, the phrase has become synonymous with:
- abusive behavior;
- bad faith conduct;
- a means for swindling creditors;
- the antithesis of “doing what’s right”;
- a tool for avoiding liability;
- etc., etc.
Describing a legal tactic as a “Texas Two-Step” is like calling that tactic a “#$&*#%R&” or “#*$&.” It’s a legal expletive that means “really, really bad.”
This morning, the Supreme Court decided Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., which clarifies that any party with a "direct financial stake in the outcome" of a reorganization has standing as a "party in interest" to object to a Chapter 11 plan. 11 U.S.C. 1109(b). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor held that the debtor's insurer has standing to object even if the plan purports to preserve the insurer's legal rights and thus is said to be "insurance neutral."
The U.S. Supreme Court held last week in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. that an insurance company with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a “party in interest” with the right to object to a Chapter 11 reorganization plan.
Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
Building on emerging trends, 2024 has seen a continued rise in the use of equity-linked debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing in Chapter 11 cases.
Recent examples from WeWork and Enviva illustrate how stakeholders are leveraging this innovative tool to drive broader reorganization strategies and outcomes rather than as a mechanism solely providing interim financing to fund a debtor’s operations during the pendency of its bankruptcy case.
WeWork
On June 6, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its much-anticipated decision in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser GypsumCo., Inc., et al. No. 22-1079. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sotomayor,1 the Court vacated a Fourth Circuit decision and ruled in favor of Truck Insurance Exchange, confirming that an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a "party in interest" and therefore has standing to object to a Chapter 11 plan.
On June 6, 2024, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., No. 22-1079, conferring broad standing to debtors’ pre-bankruptcy liability insurers to appear and be heard in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. The ruling eliminates the “insurance neutrality” doctrine that previously constrained the participation of insurers in Chapter 11, greatly expanding insurers’ capacity to influence the reorganization process.
Background: Insurer Standing in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Today, in Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, the Supreme Court held that debtors who paid fees in bankruptcy cases administered by the U.S. Trustee Program are not entitled to any relief, even though the Court previously ruled that those debtors had been unconstitutionally overcharged. This decision is the culmination of several years of litigation concerning differential fee structures across judicial districts.